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ABSTRACT
An integrated, nationwide carbon policy is essential to achieve US environmental targets
relating to carbon emissions. The carbon policy literature is loaded with qualitative analysis
of the implications or mechanisms of an integrated emissions market across the US, but
current quantitative studies do not offer solutions regarding the interactions of coexisting
US regional emission markets and other policy instruments. Therefore, this dissertation
attempts to answer three fundamental concerns about US carbon policy. The second chap-
ter analyzes the welfare implications of different relative stringencies of cap-setting under a
proposed integration of two emissions markets, considering the attributes relevant to each
market. The third chapter extends this market integration analysis by adding an intertem-
poral feature to analyze the consequences of integrating existing emission markets in the US
(i.e., California and RGGI). The fourth chapter examines the adverse economic implications
of adopting several overlapping carbon policy instruments to regulate carbon emissions in a
region. The second and third chapters employ a simple structural model with a stochastic
variable to account for uncertainties in emissions. The fourth chapter utilizes a static general
equilibrium framework based on IMPLAN data for California to comprehensively evaluate
the reactions of the state-wide economy to various carbon policy settings. In general, the
results show that integrating existing emissions markets could generate both positive and
negative effects on economic welfare. The positive effects result from gains from trading
permits, while negative results come from perverse second-best interactions. Policymakers
are expected to carefully consider the factors and attributes of all regions prior to setting
their policy targets and designing an integrated system of carbon reduction.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER 2 NON-BINDING CAPS AND THE EXPECTED GAINS FROM
LINKING EMISSIONS PERMIT MARKETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Analytical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Model Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.1 Cost-minimizing Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.2 Gains from Trade Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.1 More Stringent Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.2 Equally Stringent Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3.3 Less Stringent Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.4 Gains from Trade Distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
CHAPTER 3 THE CALIFORNIA-RGGI EMISSIONS MARKETS INTEGRATION
AND STOCHASTIC EFFECTS ON EMISSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.1 Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
iv
3.2 Stage-1: Forecasting Baseline Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.2.1 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2.2.1 Emissions Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2.2.2 Economic Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2.2.3 CDD and HDD Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2.2.4 Renewable and Nuclear Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2.2.5 Energy Price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2.3 VAR Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2.4 VAR Estimation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.5 Emissions Forecast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3 Stage-2: Calibrating MAC Curves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3.1 Estimation Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3.2 Existing MAC Curves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3.2.1 California MAC Curve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3.2.2 RGGI MAC Curve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3.2.3 Regional MAC Curves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3.3 MAC Function Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3.4 MAC Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4 Stage-3: Estimating Welfare Gains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4.1 Structural Model Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4.2 Estimation Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
v
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
CHAPTER 4 CARBON POLICY INTERACTIONS IN CALIFORNIA AND
POTENTIAL LOSSES FROM LINKING EMISSIONS MARKETS . . . 71
4.1 Carbon Policy Instruments in California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.1.1 California cap-and-trade (CTS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.1.2 Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.1.3 Linking Permit Markets via CPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.2 Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.2.1 Linked Permit Markets Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.2.2 Coexisting Policy Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2.3 Computable General Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3 Model Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.4 Data Descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.5.1 Base Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.5.2.1 CTS and RPS (and No Trade) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.5.2.2 CTS and Trade (and No RPS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.5.2.3 CTS, RPS, and Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
REFERENCES CITED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
APPENDIX A - VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIVE (VAR) ESTIMATION RESULTS . 108
vi
APPENDIX B - HISTORICAL VALUES OF THE ENDOGENOUS AND
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
APPENDIX C - PROJECTED GROWTH RATE OF EXOGENOUS VARIABLES . 116
APPENDIX D - FORECAST MONTHLY EMISSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
APPENDIX E - GAMS MODEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 2.1 Stochastic shock impact on the baseline level of emissions . . . . . . . . . . 8
Figure 2.2 Illustration of gains from trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Figure 2.3 Illustration of gains from trade in excess demand framework . . . . . . . 10
Figure 2.4 Illustration of expected gains from trade as a function of correlation . . . 14
Figure 2.5 Normalized expected gains as a function of correlation level when
region-1 is relatively more stringent than region-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Figure 2.6 Normalized expected gains as a function of correlation level when
region-1 is equally stringent as region-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Figure 2.7 Normalized expected gains as a function of correlation level when
region-1 is relatively less stringent than region-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Figure 2.8 Normalized expected gains as a function of correlation level when
region-1 is extremely less stringent than region-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Figure 2.9 Expected gains from trade across variety of correlations (ρ) and
abatement costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Figure 2.10 Share of expected gains from trade in each region across variety of
relative cap stringency, abatement costs, and BAU emissions . . . . . . . 21
Figure 2.11 Expected gains from trade across variety of relative cap stringency,
abatement costs, and BAU emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Figure 3.1 Illustration of least-squares approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Figure 3.2 Illustration of two MAC curves with distinct slopes . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Figure 3.3 Forecast results of annual RGGI CO2 emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Figure 3.4 Forecast results of annual RGGI CO2 emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Figure 3.5 California marginal abatement cost curve, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
viii
Figure 3.6 Regional marginal abatement cost curve, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Figure 3.7 Estimated marginal abatement cost curves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Figure 3.8 Estimated marginal abatement cost curves functions . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Figure 3.9 Marginal abatement cost curves calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Figure 3.10 Projected emissions levels (baseline, cap, and linked) between
California and RGGI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Figure 3.11 Number of net permits imported by California (positive vertical axis)
and RGGI (negative vertical axis) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Figure 3.12 California’s range of annual CO2 emissions compared to its cap-setting . . 59
Figure 3.13 RGGI’s range of annual CO2 emissions compared to its cap-setting . . . . 59
Figure 3.14 Estimated welfare gains from permits trading, in million US$ . . . . . . . 60
Figure 3.15 California’s emissions level (mean) under sensitivity scenarios . . . . . . . 63
Figure 3.16 RGGI’s emissions level (mean) under sensitivity scenarios . . . . . . . . . 63
Figure 3.17 Trade price (mean) under sensitivity scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Figure 3.18 Net permits imported by California (positive vertical axis) and RGGI
(negative vertical axis) under sensitivity scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Figure 3.19 Estimated RGGI’s welfare gains from permits trading, in million US$ . . 67
Figure 3.20 Estimated California’s welfare gains from permits trading, in million US$ . 68
Figure 4.1 Illustration of different regional MAC curves and cap-settings that
trigger permit trading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Figure 4.2 Illustration of marginal abatement cost curves of CTS with and without
RPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Figure 4.3 Production of good nested CES structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Figure 4.4 Consumer welfare nested CES structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Figure 4.5 Respective carbon policy implications for generation share . . . . . . . . . 88
ix
Figure 4.6 Respective carbon policy implications for welfare change . . . . . . . . . . 89
Figure 4.7 Welfare change difference of cap-and-trade system (CTS) with different
stringencies (20% and 17%) combined with other policy instruments. . . . 94
Figure B.1 Historical monthly CO2 emissions from power plants in California and
RGGI states . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Figure B.2 Historical real GDP per capita in California and RGGI states . . . . . . 113
Figure B.3 Historical monthly average CDD in California and RGGI states . . . . . 113
Figure B.4 Historical monthly average HDD in California and RGGI states . . . . . 114
Figure B.5 Historical regional energy supply by type in California . . . . . . . . . . 114
Figure B.6 Historical regional energy supply by type in the RGGI . . . . . . . . . . 115
Figure B.7 Historical monthly average coal and natural gas price in the US . . . . . 115
Figure C.1 Projected US GDP, California’s and RGGI’s population . . . . . . . . . 116
Figure C.2 Projected energy supply by type in California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Figure C.3 Projected energy supply by type in RGGI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Figure C.4 Projected energy price by source type in California . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Figure D.1 Forecast Monthly Emissions of California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
Figure D.2 Forecast Monthly Emissions of RGGI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
x
LIST OF TABLES
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics of data for VAR estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Table 3.2 Model selection criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Table 3.3 Estimation parameter values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Table 3.4 Calibration parameter values of permit markets as of July 2015 . . . . . . 50
Table 3.5 Emissions levels and differences in no-trade and trade scenarios, in
million tons CO2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Table 3.6 Price levels and differences in no-trade and trade scenarios, in USD . . . . 57
Table 3.7 Mean expected gains from permits trading, in million US$ . . . . . . . . . 61
Table 3.8 Level of cap-setting for base scenario, scenario-1, and scenario-2 . . . . . . 62
Table 3.9 Mean permit price under no-trade, trade, and sensitivity scenarios, in
US$/CO2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Table 4.1 Model variables description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Table 4.2 Name and description of sectors, factors, and agents in the CGE model . . 81
Table 4.3 California’s 2013 carbon coefficient based on the CARB report . . . . . . . 84
Table 4.4 California’s electricity generation share per energy group (EIA, 2015) . . . 84
Table 4.5 Elasticities of substitution used in the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Table 4.6 California carbon policy sets and descriptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Table 4.7 Respective carbon policy implications for emissions level, emissions
reduction, and permit trading parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Table 4.8 Description of scenarios for sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Table 4.9 Implications of various combinations of carbon policy instruments for
emissions levels, emissions reduction, and permit trading parameters . . . 93
xi
Table 4.10 Composition of generation share by energy source group based on
respective carbon policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Table 4.11 Implications of changes in carbon policy stringencies for welfare change . . 96
Table A.1 VAR estimation statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
xii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
First and foremost, Al-hamdu lillahi rabbil ’alamin for giving me the strength to
complete this dissertation.
This dissertation was possible only because of the comfort, support, sacrifices, and
patience of my partner in life, my wife Andani, and also my child, Caesar, and his future
siblings, Inshaa Allah.
I am forever in debt to my beloved parents, my siblings, and my parent-in-laws.
They all have made me able to accomplish what I have accomplished today.
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisers, Harrison Fell, Edward
Balistreri, and Peter Maniloff for their invaluable knowledge and guidance throughout my
time in the department.
My deepest appreciation to The Sadagoris, The Badruddins, and The Putras for
their unconditional support during my family’s ups and downs. I thank my FIFA Mines
Liga rivals (Andreas Lumban Gaol, Mohammed Kemal, Abdullah Nurhasan, and Imam
Akimaya) for the fun moments during the tough times and for letting me entirely dominate
our competition. I also thank the rest of Indonesian community in Golden.
Last but not least, I thank fellow Ph.D. comrades, especially Khalid Aljihrish, Simon
Prassetyo, Yahya Anouti, Timo Lohman, Matthew Doyle, Andrew Gulley, Ross Manley,
and Michael Redlinger, whose friendship have made my time at the campus much more
delightful.
xiii
To the love of my life, my inspiration, my other half, Andani
To Caesar, Zayd and their future sibling(s)
To my Mama, Papa, Mir, Bapak, Nina, and Nashir




Policymakers and scholars in the environmental realm are continuously facing the co-
nundrums of appropriately internalizing the externalities from greenhouse gasses emissions,
particularly from carbon dioxide (carbon or CO2). Numerous fruitless attempts to institute
a collective policy that stipulates the conditions for all parties has prompted many indi-
vidualized policy instruments (e.g., carbon tax, cap-and-trade or emissions markets, design
standards, etc.) with various designs and levels as well as different provisions and strin-
gency. The adoption of multiple policy instruments in regulating emissions, however, could
result in unintended consequences, and many papers have attempted to assess the implica-
tions of adopting several policy instruments in addressing a specific issue (e.g., Bennear and
Stavins (2007); Goulder and Parry (2008); Böhringer and Rosendahl (2010), Goulder et al.
(2012)). Other papers discuss the significance of integrating multiple policy instruments
(i.e., emissions markets) into a single, linked system to facilitate collaborative action as well
as optimize efforts to control global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (e.g., Jaffe and Stavins
(2008); Stern (2007); Flachsland et al. (2009); Tuerk et al. (2009)).
Despite the sizable literature on carbon policy, there are gaps that this dissertation
offers two contributions to fill. First, it evaluates the welfare implications of the interaction
of the California and RGGI emissions markets via an integrated or linked system. Most
papers ignore the importance of including exogenous stochastic effects on emissions. These
effects are employed in this paper as an additional model feature to evaluate the integration.
Second, this thesis also addresses the welfare implications of a linked emissions markets
system coexisting with other carbon policy instruments in California (i.e., renewable portfolio
standards).
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Subsequent to the introduction of the Kyoto Protocol, many attempts to internalize the
externality from CO2 emission have been initiated. At the US state-level, California has been
implementing several carbon policy instruments that regulate across many sectors, such as
renewable portfolio standards (RPS) and cap-and-trade system (CTS or emissions market)
under their Assembly Bill 32. The northeastern US states collectively formed the Regional
Greenhouse Gases Initiative (RGGI) emissions market as a policy instrument to regulate
their carbon emissions, coupled with their state-specific RPS. Other US states have also
adopted state-specific regulations.
At the federal level, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed the Clean
Power Plan (CPP) program that is intended to regulate emissions from new and existing
power plants. The program is based on four building blocks of regulation. The CPP offers
a high degree of flexibility for states to choose their methods of reducing emissions from
electricity generation. One of the methods is cap-and-trade, a market-based mechanism
that allows the regulated entities to select the least-cost option for compliance. So far, this
market-based mechanism is the US electricity industry’s most preferred method to reduce
emissions (Webb and Taylor (2015)). However, the literature is still lack of quantitative
evidences that a US nationwide emissions market system will be effective.
Most studies based on a quantitative framework of linking emissions markets focus on
the multinational dimension, such as the collaboration of European Union, Asian, and North
American emissions markets. Anger (2008) studies the various efficiency and inefficiency
gains using both general and partial equilibrium frameworks based on potential cost sav-
ings from multinational linking permit markets. He further extends the study by including
extra potential cost savings if offset project-based programs (e.g., the Clean Development
Mechanism of Kyoto Protocol) are included in the trading systems. The most relevant quan-
titative study of US multi-state collaboration so far is conducted by Pizer and Yates (2013).
However, their study is presented in a delinking framework, which addresses the event of
New Jersey’s exit from the RGGI. They find that it is important to consider post-delinking
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elements (e.g., permit distributions and permit restrictions after delinking) prior to link their
program.
Burtraw et al. (2015) argues that the implementation of the EPA’s CPP will provide a
platform for a national emissions market allowing multiple states to collaborate within each
state’s restrictions. However, they do not provide empirical evidence that this collaboration
is likely to be pursued. Burtraw et al. (2013) introduces a unique design for linking emissions
markets in North America, which they name linking-by-degrees. They assert the necessity
of harmonizing attributes of each emissions market prior to initiating a linked system.
The literature also offers numerous analyses of implementing multiple policy instruments
in regulating the environmental sector in the US. Fischer and Preonas (2010) qualitatively
analyze the importance of evaluating and selecting an appropriate and optimal combination
of policy instruments to address problems in renewable energy development in the US. Morris
et al. (2010) utilize an intertemporal general equilibrium framework to examine the implica-
tions for global welfare of adopting both RPS and CTS policy instruments in the US. Their
analysis shows significant adverse impacts of RPS policy to welfare in various stringency
settings, in the absence of CTS. Karplus et al. (2012) emphasize the interaction effects of
combining two policy instruments (CTS and fuel economy standards) on environmental and
economic efficiency. Their results show a compelling effect of the latter instrument on eco-
nomic efficiency. Palmer et al. (2011) present the environmental and economic consequences
of adopting standalone and combinations of CTS, RPS, and tax credits in the US. They found
that CTS is the soundest policy, environmentally and economically, in achieving emissions
reduction targets. At the state level, the conditions of overlapping environmental policies
that could yield undesirable economic and environmental inefficiencies have been discussed
in a few papers (e.g., Goulder and Stavins (2011); McGuinness and Ellerman (2008)).
This rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents a simple structural
model of linking emissions permit markets with different stringency and compliance cost at-
tributes. Chapter 3 extends this model by adding intertemporal feature analysis and applies
3
the model to a possible linked system of California and RGGI emissions markets. Chapter
4 uses a general equilibrium framework to analyze the interactions of several carbon policy
instruments in California and to examine possible welfare impacts due to the coexistence of
these instruments. Chapter 5 concludes the entire analysis.
4
CHAPTER 2
NON-BINDING CAPS AND THE EXPECTED GAINS FROM LINKING EMISSIONS
PERMIT MARKETS
The cap-and-trade system has been widely used as an instrument to solve externali-
ties related to emissions reduction program. The first notable use of this market-based
instrument1 in the United States came from the establishment of the Clean Air Act (CAA)
Amendments in 1990 to address acid rain from sulfur dioxide. The implementation of cap-
and-trade in the CAA resulted in a significant decrease of SO2 emissions (EPA (2005)) and
an annual cost savings of around $1 billion compared to any command-and-control approach
(Carlson et al. (2000)). Subsequent to the CAA and the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, many
cap-and-trade systems have emerged at various levels—subnational, regional, national, and
even multinational—as initiatives to reduce emissions, particularly carbon dioxide (CO2).
In the U.S., the Regional Greenhouse Gases Initiatives (RGGI) and California’s Assembly
Bill 32 (AB32) were implemented as examples for other states to follow.
In a cap-and-trade system, companies receive a supply of permits to emit2 (by setting
a cap) and may also demand permits to cover emissions (through permit trading). There
has been a great deal of discussion in the literature of the significance of linking individual
tradable permit systems in achieving ultimate climate goals (Jaffe and Stavins (2008); Stern
(2007); Tuerk et al. (2009)). It is argued that linking tradable permit systems could become
either a stepping stone or stumbling block toward these goals. This chapter analyzes the
potential gains (or losses) from trading permits if two regional markets are linked. The gains
1The two types of market-based approach are tax (price-based) and cap-and-trade (quantity-based). The
debates over using either one of them in emission reduction have been ongoing ever since Weitzman (1974).
However, a quantity-based mechanism for emissions reduction program is becoming more popular among
policymakers.
2The common approaches in distributing the permits are free allowance, grandfathering, auctioning, offset
credits, and trading. This chapter assumes a fixed permit supply provided by the regulator since our analysis
uses a static-single period model. The model ignores any significance from permit distribution method to
our analysis.
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from trade here refer to the result of compliance cost minimization due to permit trading;
the impact on other nonmonetary factors (e.g., health, climate, etc.) is not of concern for
the purpose of this dissertation. The main interest is to discover how trading agents should
strategically decide on setting their stringency (cap) considering market attributes prior to
linking their regional tradable permit systems with those of another regional system.
The results indicate that there are unexpected impacts to gains from trade after integrat-
ing (or linking) two tradable permit systems due to several factors: (1) relative stringency of
each regions cap-setting, (2) correlation level between both regions, and (3) each regions rela-
tive abatement cost. Difference in stringency triggers permits trading between two emissions
permit markets. More stringent cap-setting in a regional tradable permit system relative to
another region will undoubtedly increase the expected global gains from trade in nominal
values. Less relative stringency also increases gains from trade in both regions until the cap is
non-binding. A non-binding cap in one region decreases the gains from trade in the particular
region due to the scarcity effect of tradable permits. Moreover, the distribution of expected
gains from trade will transform as cap-setting stringency becomes less, from a concave curve
to convex, until it reaches the current emissions level. Equally stringent cap-setting will
produce a decreasing curve as correlation value increases (from -1 to 1), while a relatively
less stringent cap-setting will produce a convex, U-shaped curve. The minimum point of the
U-shaped curve will also shift towards depending on the relative level of marginal abatement
costs, cap-setting, and baseline emissions. Difference in abatement costs and baseline level
of emissions influence the magnitude of the change to gains from trade.
The analysis offers a new dimension to the literature on linking tradable permits by
presenting the implications of cap-setting and regional correlation for global gains from trade.
Welfare gain from permit trading is a reinterpretation of the where-flexibility described by
Böhringer et al. (2006)3. The other two types of flexibility are essentially eliminated as the
3Böhringer et al. (2006) lay out three types of flexibility in the emissions reduction concept: what-flexibility
(types of GHG to reduce), where-flexibility (cheapest option in reducing emissions), and when-flexibility
(timing of reducing emissions). Their discussion focuses on the first type. The third type relates to
intertemporal provisions such as banking and borrowing, which are ignored in this chapter.
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types of greenhouse gases (GHG) to reduce and effective date of the policy are regulated,
particularly under U.S. CAA section 111.
CAA section 111 proposes the Clean Power Plan (CPP), which authorizes the states
to implement the emissions guidelines in addressing the GHG emissions from fossil fuel-fire
power plants. It establishes different targets depending on the electricity generation mix in
each state, with overall projected reduction in 2030 to be 30% from 2005 emissions. The
CPP also grants the states full flexibility in terms of program design in complying with
reduction targets4, including the options of trading permits within the state, trading across
the states, increasing the usage of lower-emitting fuel sources, and setting a more stringent
standard than the standards established by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In
this paper, we only consider the second and last options to be consistent with the concept of
where-flexibility. The first option is immediately covered by the representative agent notion.
We ignore the third option since increasing capacity for lower-emitting fuel sources (i.e.,
renewables, nuclear) creates a time lag between capacity construction and operation.
Section 2.1 presents the analytical framework for the unrealized consequences of setting
the cap in a regional permit market. Section 2.2 presents the model setup of the link
between two regional markets. Section 2.3 presents the results and analysis. Section 2.4
concludes and provides a few comments for policymakers to consider.
2.1 Analytical Framework
Figure 2.1 displays the stochastic shocks on emissions that shift the marginal abatement
cost (MAC) curve.5 In non-restrictive conditions, emitting agent-i (i=1,2) possesses the right
to generate as much emission as possible or business-as-usual (BAU) emissions (EBAUi ). Any
significant stochastic shocks due to a variety of exogenous factors could shift the emissions
4The EPA established four building blocks for compliance. Explanations of these can be found in their
documents.
5This dissertation reserves the term of marginal abatement cost (MAC) in place of marginal benefit of
emitting one more quantity of emissions (Ei) in the price ($/CO2) vs. quantity graphs
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i , which also shifts the MAC curve to left and right, respectively.
Consequently, the autarky price will shift away from PAi , with the presumption that the
shocks are insignificant to the slope of the MAC curves.
Figure 2.1: Stochastic shock impact on the baseline level of emissions
Since our focus is to understand the where-flexibility of reducing emissions, which essen-
tially comes from permit trading, it is essential to analyze the concept of tradable permits
in the context of emissions reduction as illustrated in Figure 2.2. The MAC for each region
(MAC1 and MAC2) displays a downward sloping curve because it represents the increase of
the cost of abating one more unit of pollution, or the decrease of abatement cost in emitting
one unit more of pollution. For simplicity, this chapter also assumes linear MAC in both
regions with three varieties of slope (β) at region-1 relative to region-2: lower (β1 < β2),
equal (β1 = β2), or higher (β1 > β2).
The marginal benefit (MB) curves for each region (MB1 andMB2) represent the fixed cap
set by its regulators, which also means the fixed permit supply that is set by the regulators
8
Figure 2.2: Illustration of gains from trade
in each region. PA1 and P
A
2 denote the respective autarky prices of region-1 and region-2
where the regional MAC curves intersect the MB curve—economic condition of marginal
cost equates marginal benefits.
Three essential assumptions that we posit in this setting are (1) permit supply provisions
are treated as additional supply to the fixed cap, (2) one-time trading/compliance, and (3)
a very high non-compliance penalty. The first assumption holds one regions permit sup-
ply fixed at the time of trading. Provisions such as banking6 and offset project credits are
considered as a relaxing factor to the fixed permit supply that is distributed via grandfa-
thering or auctioning set by regulators. Our second assumption asserts the preemption of
banking permits from one compliance period to another. The third assumption obligates the
representative agents to comply with the emissions cap with no exception.7
6This study focuses on cross-region impacts, not time, of linking the regional markets.
7It will be worthwhile in future study to insert the penalty factor into the model, as it might be the last
option that agents elect due to its expense.
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To study the gains from permit trading, it is beneficial to translate the previous price-
quantity concept into a price-excess demand concept (E − E). This chapter examine the
variety of stringency level of the region-1 cap setting, ranging from a stringent cap (50%
of BAU1) to a lax cap (120% of BAU1), conditional on a region 2 cap at 80% of BAU2.
These various cap level settings portray the current conditions in tradable permit systems
around the globe in which some are relatively lax and some are relatively strict in terms of
cap setting. For instance, the RGGI has a relatively lax cap setting compared to California
AB32, and considering the possibility of linking between both systems, it is essential to
examine the correlation level and relative cap setting between both. In another case, the
European Union (EU) trading system has been criticized for its over-allocation of permits
as a consequence of its relaxed banking and offset credits provision.
Figure 2.3: Illustration of gains from trade in excess demand framework
Assuming β1 < β2, Figure 2.3 illustrates the case of less relatively stringent cap-setting
of two regions with different slopes of the MAC curve. PA1 and P
A
2 denote the autarky
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prices of region-1 and region-2, respectively. P ∗ is the permit trading price with amount of
permit traded equals Z, where Z1 = −Z2, which means region-1 is the permit seller and
region-2 is the permit buyer region.
2.2 Model Setup
This section explains the cost-minimizing model and gains from trade model that are
used in the analysis of Chapter 2 and 3.
2.2.1 Cost-minimizing Model
This section presents the basic linking model of two representative agents from each
region (i = 1, 2). Consider that cost-minimizing agents seek to reduce CO2 emissions, a flow
pollutant in unit of aggregate emissions per time. The model considers a static, one-period
trade over one time compliance period. Let equation 2.1 define the permit trading condition
in one region, where Ei is the actual level of emissions in region-i, Ei is the cap level of
emissions in region-i, and Zi is the amount of permits traded by region-i.
8 Zi is positive for
buyer region and negative for seller region.
Ei = Ei + Zi (2.1)
The actual level of emissions is the result of the abatement effort by region-i, ai, from the
BAU emissions level when regulation is absent, EBi . Stochastic shocks variable is introduced
to incorporate the uncertainties related with the intercept of the marginal abatement cost,
or baseline emissions level, due to asymmetric information in each region. Let random
variable θi denote the stochastic shock to E
B
i . It is independently and identically distributed
(iid), such that:
8The model considers no trading limit in this paper following the full-flexibility provision from the EPA for
states to comply with the Clean Power Plan. However, it might be worthwhile in the future to see the

















where − 1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1
Equation 2.3 shows the relationship of stochastic shocks to current emissions level and
abatement effort in region-i.
Ei = E
B
i + θi − ai (2.3)
The convex abatement cost function Ci(ai), where C
′
i(ai) > 0, C
′′
i (ai) ≥ 0, is specified in the
form of equation 2.4. In this nonlinear form10, βi is the slope of the marginal abatement
cost in region-i and θi is the stochastic shock to the baseline emissions level. Each region
also faces transaction costs from trading permits, defined as the function of τi(Zi), where
τ ′i(Zi), τ
′′





(EBi + θi − Ei)
2 (2.4)
Let Pi(Zi) denotes the price of permits in region-i, and given the tradable permits function,
abatement cost function, and transaction cost function, then is implies a cost-minimization
9It will be useful for future researchers to add the feature of correlation across time when a multi-period
model is used.
10Assumption of nonlinear convex abatement costs follows Fell et al. (2012) and Hoel and Karp (2002). By
assuming negligible technological transfer when markets are linked, regional MAC characteristics are hence
similar before and after linking.
11The assumption of strictly convex transaction costs is a valid one considering the nature of limited permits
available at a certain time. It can also represent the potential penalty an agent faces if not compliant.
Stavins (1995) offers an extensive analysis of transaction costs for tradable permits and their effect on the
market. However, for the sake of simplicity, constant transaction cost is used for now.
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problem for a regulated region as shown in equation 2.5 and the reduced form in equation 2.6.
minaiΣi{Pi(Zi) + Ci(ai) + τi(Zi)} s.t. ai, Pi, Zi ≥ 0 (2.5)
minaiΣi{Pi(E
B
i + θi − ai − Ei) + Ci(E
B
i + θi − Ei) + τi(Zi)} s.t. ai, Pi, Zi ≥ 0 (2.6)
Since this chapter considers two regional programs, it can then characterize the solution
to this minimization problem with the first order conditions described in equation 2.7 and
2.8. The former shows that, in region-i, marginal abatement cost equates permit prices.





i + θi − Ei) (2.7)
Pi + τ
′
i(Zi) = Pj (2.8)
2.2.2 Gains from Trade Model
The potential regional and total gains from trade-from-trade are defined by equations 2.9
and 2.10, respectively. The relationship in equation 2.9 defines the area of a welfare triangle
as a result of permit trading, and is in absolute terms. In a normal trading condition, it is
expected to see a monotonic increasing graph as a function of correlation level (from 1 to





i ) · (Ei − E
B
i ) | (2.9)




i ) · (Ei − E
B
i ) | (2.10)
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Figure 2.4: Illustration of expected gains from trade as a function of correlation
2.3 Results
This section discusses the results for normalized expected gains from trading permits
(E[GFT ]) as a function of correlation level from -1 to 1 when the starting point of the
baseline level of emissions (BAU) in each region prior to linking is varied. This chapter
examines the impacts of various stringency levels (from more stringent to extremely relaxed)
on total gains from trade and their distribution across two regions. It also introduces the
effects of varying regional marginal abatement cost on gains from trade from linking.
2.3.1 More Stringent Case
Figure 2.5 presents the total gains from trade when region-1 set a relatively stricter
emissions cap than region-2. The left-hand side shows the results for cap-setting at 50% of
BAU, and the right-hand side shows the results for cap setting at 75% of BAU. For the former
cap-setting, the gains from trade are consistently concave for all three different BAU and
abatement cost conditions. This shows an expected outcome from trading permits between
two regions in which gains from trade decrease monotonically in the positive correlation
level section , or when value of ρ ranges from 0 to 1. The result for the latter cap-setting
14
is more diverse as it shows that the transformation of the expected gains from trade curve
from concave to convex via a monotonically decreasing state at certain conditions. This
demonstrates the unrealized consequence of having a cheaper marginal abatement cost in
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Figure 2.5: Normalized expected gains as a function of correlation level when region-1 is
relatively more stringent than region-2
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2.3.2 Equally Stringent Case
Figure 2.6 displays the results when the cap-setting of both regions is equally stringent.
It shows the transformation of the expected welfare gain curve when the BAU emissions
level and costs of marginal abatement are varied. As region-1 BAU level decreases relative
to that of region-2, the expected total gains from trade change significantly depending on
the relative difference of marginal abatement costs. Similar to the more stringent case, the
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Figure 2.6: Normalized expected gains as a function of correlation level when region-1 is
equally stringent as region-2
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2.3.3 Less Stringent Case
Figure 2.8 present the results of less stringent cap-setting in region-1 relative to region-2.
The convex curves of the expected gains from trade are consistent throughout the case.
However, it can be observed that the minimum point of the curve is uncommon for a few
cases, indicating upper-left curves in Figure 2.7 and a middle-right curve in Figure 2.8.
These distinctions suggest that the role of relative differences in marginal abatement costs,
which characterize the differences in technology of each region, affects the total gains from
trade when permit trading is allowed.
2.3.4 Gains from Trade Distributions
Figure 2.9 shows the distribution of expected gains from trade across varieties of corre-
lations values and relative marginal abatement costs. The curves of each scenario in each
region are overlapping because of the extremely slight changes across different scenarios.
Normalized gains from trade is therefore used to magnify the changes. Figure 2.10 shows
the share of expected gains from trade in both trading regions across scenarios of region-1
cap-setting at: (1) 50% of BAU1, (2) 75% of BAU1, (3) 80% of BAU1, (4) 90% of BAU1,
(5) 100% of BAU1, (6) 110% of BAU1, and (7) 120% of BAU1. All scenarios are conditional
on region-2 cap-setting at 80% of BAU. Without losing the significance of the results, the
analysis opts to display equal marginal abatement costs in each region (β1 = β2) as the
other two cases (β1 < β2 and β1 > β2) produce similar graphs with marginal differences in
magnitude.
These figures display the different transformation of gains from trade if region-1 relaxes
its cap-setting depending on the baseline level of emissions (BAU) in each region. Since
correlations has slight impacts on the expected gains from trade without altering the shape
of the curves, the correlations values of expected gains on the displayed figures are at 0.5.12
12The selection of 0.5 as the correlation value is based on common sense that the correlation between regions
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Figure 2.7: Normalized expected gains as a function of correlation level when region-1 is
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Figure 2.8: Normalized expected gains as a function of correlation level when region-1 is
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Figure 2.10: Share of expected gains from trade in each region across variety of relative cap





















1 - slope MAC1 > MAC2
2 - slope MAC1 = MAC2

















Region-1 Cap (% of BAU)
Graphs by relative slope of MAC level


















1 - slope MAC1 > MAC2
2 - slope MAC1 = MAC2

















Region-1 Cap (% of BAU)
Graphs by relative slope of MAC level


















1 - slope MAC1 > MAC2
2 - slope MAC1 = MAC2

















Region-1 Cap (% of BAU)
Graphs by relative slope of MAC level
Expected Total Gains From Trade
  
Figure 2.11: Expected gains from trade across variety of relative cap stringency, abatement
costs, and BAU emissions
Relatively more stringent conditions (scenarios 1 to 3) produce similar distribution to
both regions with either concave, monotonically decreasing, or convex curves, depending
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on the BAUs. Normal stringency condition (scenario 4) holds similar outcomes. However,
when region-1 relaxes its cap-setting (scenarios 5 to 7), there are distortions to the regional
gains from trade. The magnitude of gains from trade difference becomes even larger when
BAU in region-1 is above or equals BAU in region-2. The upper graph in Figure 2.10 when
β1 > β2 suggests zero expected gains from trade in region-1 because of the excessive amount
of permits in region-1 even after it covers the compliance of both regions. In contrast, the
middle graph in Figure 2.10 when β1 = β2 suggests a significant drop in expected gains from
trade of region-2 due to very lax cap-setting in region-1. Figure 2.11 presents the expected
gains from trade across the scenarios.
The distortion to expected gains in region-1 shows the importance of evaluating the
scarcity of permits in the linked market environment. As region-1 becomes less stringent
and permits become less valuable, they can still capture some of gains from trade until a
certain point where they cap is non-binding (cap equals to BAU emissions level). From this
point onwards, gains from trade in region-1 is decreasing because the permit is invaluable in
their region, yet still transferred to region-2 for their compliance.
Our results show several implications for strategic decision making for policymakers
to carefully consider their position and others prior to linking their regional tradable
permit system with that of another regional system. First, it is critical to understand
each system’s position in regional environmental goals as the level of cap is essential for
the global gains from trade. As in game theory perspective, policymakers should not
only prepare their regional system in terms of their emissions level, existing technology,
their environmental goals, and other permit supply opportunities (i.e., banking and offset
credits), but also recognize each one of these elements in other regions too. Second, the
policymakers have to gauge the correlation level of both regions prior to linking, assuming
that linking will not change the prior correlation level. An overestimation can result in a
potential decrease of gains from trade in certain conditions. Lastly, policymakers have to be
prepared to strategically adjust the elements of their tradable permit systems accordingly
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prior to linking. The two suggested provisions to adjust are primary permit supply from
the cap-setting and secondary permits supply from banking and offset credits.
2.4 Conclusion
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed an integrated system in the
Clean Power Plan in June 2014. This plan is expected take effect in 2017 and provides
full flexibility for the 50 states to achieve their individual emissions targets. It also allows
trading permits between states. However, each state has distinct environmental targets,
perspectives, and conditions, which could result in unintended consequences if their systems
are integrated or linked.
This chapter provides an analysis that shows that there are unexpected consequences
to gains from trade if regional emissions permit systems are linked. Using a two-region,
one-period model, there are three main factors that could become significant to the global
and regional gains from trade. First, the relative stringency of cap-setting between both
regions can cause potential welfare loss if not considered carefully. This cap-setting is the
realization of each states environmental target and available permits for trading. A relatively
less stringent environmental target will cause various effects on the total gains from trade.
Second, different technology levels in different states–reflected in marginal abatement costs–
influence total gains from trade, assuming no technology transfer is permitted during the
linking. In other words, a less costly marginal abatement cost in a relatively less stringent
state has a different effect on the total gains from trade. Lastly, the current baseline emissions
level in each state has a significant impact on welfare gain after linking.
The implications of the results to policymakers are significant in terms of preparing their
regional tradable permit system designs or elements prior to linking with another system,
such as cap-setting or assigning permits, technological possession, banking/borrowing pro-
vision, and offset credit mechanisms. Furthermore, policymakers have to acknowledge the
designs of the other system in order to maximize total gains from trade and be prepared to
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adjust or change the systems elements prior to linking.
Further work is clearly necessary to examine the implications from linking in a dynamic
perspective via a multi-period model and the addition of notable trading provisions (i.e.,
trading limit, price collars, or banked permit discount).
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CHAPTER 3
THE CALIFORNIA-RGGI EMISSIONS MARKETS INTEGRATION AND
STOCHASTIC EFFECTS ON EMISSIONS
Since climate change has become a political and economic issue in recent years, regula-
tions and policies on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are being enacted around the globe.
The most popular regulations to date are the emissions trading system (or permit market)
and carbon tax, both of which are market-based mechanisms that exist in various levels:
sub-national, national, and multinational. The European Union (EU) permit market is
the largest carbon trading system in the world so far, regulating 31 countries and focusing
mainly on the power sector. In the U.S., the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)
and California Air Regulation Board (ARB) 32 have been regulating the northeast states
and California respectively. These individualized systems are considered to be integrated (or
linked) to achieve more substantial emissions reduction results.
This chapter contributes to the literature by providing quantitative measures of the eco-
nomic implications of integrating (or linking) two individualized, regional permit markets by
considering the interrelated variables that might occur between the two linked regions. The
objects of analysis are the two largest existing permit markets in North America: California
and RGGI. The first stage of this study is an analysis of the stochastic effects (or shocks)
to emissions by exogenous factors (e.g., economic activity, weather, energy prices, etc.) and
forecasting the baseline emissions (or business-as-usual, BAU) of each market based on their
shocks. The second stage is calibrating the estimated marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve
in each market. The third stage combines the results of the first and second stage to further
estimate the impact on welfare of linking the permit markets. The results show a significant
effect of linking California and RGGI to their future emissions paths as well as welfare impact
from linking the programs.
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There are now many examples of permit markets at sub-national, national, and multi-
national levels. Kossoy et al. (2013) mapped the existing and prospective permit markets
in America, Europe, Asia, and Australia, including the variations of targets, designs, pro-
visions, and expected future actions of each permit market. The EU has a multinational
permit market that is currently regarded as the largest permit market in the world and
consists of 28 EU member and three non-EU member countries. In North America, the
Regional Greenhouse Gases Initiative (RGGI) was established in 2009 for several states and
provinces in the northeastern regions of the United States and Canada.13 In 2013, Quebec
and California cap-and-trades were established in response to the Western Climate Initiative
(WCI) permit market agreement. They were officially linked in January 2014, with the first
joint auction taking place in November the same year.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 3.1 provides a conceptual
framework and the three-stage methodology used in this paper. Section 3.2 presents the first
stage, which forecasts baseline emissions of relevant regions using a vector autoregression
(VAR) model. Section 3.3 sets out the calibration of the estimated marginal abatement
function in each region using a calibration technique from the literature. Section 3.4
integrates the results from the first two stages with an economic model of linked emission
permit markets to estimate the distributional and total welfare gains. Section 3.5 concludes
the study.
3.1 Conceptual Framework
The goal of this chapter is to empirically analyze the gains from trading carbon permits
in the two most recognized permit markets in the US: California and RGGI.14 Trading is
13RGGI was initiated by states in the northeastern U.S. and provinces in eastern Canada. It initially targeted
emissions reduction from electricity sectors. Currently, nine US states are participating in the program:
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and
Vermont. New Jersey was also a part of the program until it left the RGGI in 2011. It is important to
note that this paper only considers the U.S. states in the program.
14This study neglects the recent consolidation of the California and Quebec permit markets. This is for our
analysis because the parameters used in the first stage of forecasting emissions baselines are only applicable
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possible because of the price differences across the markets. A carbon permit system with
higher permit price will opt for a less costly alternative via obtaining permits from a lower
permit price system. By pursuing this trading option, both systems will gain from the trade.
In the current stage, the carbon prices in California significantly differ from those in RGGI.15
The analysis consists of a three-stage methodology: (1) estimate the forecast of baseline
or business-as-usual (BAU) emissions across the markets using a VAR model that incorpo-
rates relevant parameters of shock to emissions, (2) determine and calibrate the marginal
abatement cost (MAC) functions of each market using an engineering estimation approach,
and (3) calculate welfare impact from permit trading using an integrated economic model.
Conceptually, exogenous factors such as economic activity, energy prices, and weather
are expected to drive BAU emissions levels (EBAU) as illustrated in Figure 2.1 in section 2.1.
Any significant stochastic effects, or shocks θi, could shift the emissions level from E
BAU
to either E− or E+ depending upon the nature of the factor. This study assumes that the
stochastic shocks (θi) only shift the BAU emissions level, with no effect to the slope of the
MAC curve. As the shocks shift the BAU emissions level, it further shifts the relevant MAC
curve M to M− or M+.16
Equation 3.1 presents the general condition in which marginal change of emissions in
state-i at time-t, ∆ĒCO2it , depends on changes of exogenous factors or emission drivers, ∆Xit.
∆ĒCO2it = αi + βi ·∆Xit + ǫit (3.1)
As the residuals ǫit in the two regions-i, (i = 1,2) are possibly correlated
17, it is fair to
assume that the residual equals stochastic shocks to emissions (ǫi = θi). Equation 3.2 shows
the time-invariant correlation between the two regions.
to inter-state relationships.
15As of April 2015, California and RGGI permit prices stood at around US$ 4 and US$2, respectively.
16Further, this study also assumes that integrating emissions markets does not produce knowledge transfer,
hence MAC characteristics remain unchanged.
17This study uses lag operators to eliminate serial correlation that might occur in the error terms.
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The first stage determines the parameters of linear inter-dependencies between region-1 and
region-2 by employing a Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) model. VAR is a useful tool in
determining linear inter-dependencies or correlation levels of time series data, in this case
of exogenous parameters including GDP per capita, temperature, electricity demand by
sector, and energy supply by fuel types. Equation 3.3 presents the estimation for each of the
parameters in region-1 and region-2 and the error term, ǫi,t, of which defines the correlation
values between both regions.
yi,t = αii,t−p · yi,t−p + γii,t ·Xi,t + γii,t−q ·Xi,t−q + µt + ǫi,t (3.3)
X is the exogenous variables and µ is the deterministic term (i.e., seasonal dummy variable,
linear trend, or intercept). Index-i identifies the the two regions of interest (California and
RGGI). Index-t identifies the monthly observation of the data. Indexes p and q identify
the number of lag-order for the endogenous and exogenous variables, respectively.18 Once
the correlation levels are identified, the baseline emission can be projected by incorporating
forecast values of the exogenous variables/emission drivers.
The second stage is to calibrate the marginal abatement cost (MAC) function in each
region. Using method presented by Kiuila and Rutherford (2013), this paper proceeds with
an engineering estimation by using least-square approach to determine the MAC function
for California and RGGI (see Figure 3.1). This method minimizes the sum of squared of
observed and evaluated marginal costs of abatement associated with a specific technology,
assuming a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function. Equation 3.4
18The number of lag-order is defined by the algorithm using common selection criteria: Akaike information
criterion (AIC), Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQ), and Schwarz criterion (SC).
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shows the minimization subject to the CES function estimating the marginal abatement cost
curve. Estimated MAC functions are then calibrated with the parameters of each permit
markets using recorded permit prices and annual emission reduction to better portray the
conditions of the markets. The calibrated MAC functions are then incorporated to the




ωi(P̄i − P̂i) (3.4)
Figure 3.1: Illustration of least-squares approach
The third stage incorporates the baseline emissions from the first stage and the MAC func-
tion estimates from the second stage and calculates the welfare impacts of trading permits
between California and RGGI. When trading between two regions is allowed, emitting agents
in each region will opt for the least cost option, which is either to reduce emissions through
technological change or to trade permits so the entire system complies. The latter option is
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always favorable in the short-run.19
As the costs of reducing emissions in each region are different, each regional MAC curve
will then have different slopes. Figure 3.2 illustrates the condition of two different MAC
curves in a trading environment. When an emissions cap is imposed on each permit market,
regional carbon prices (PA1 , P
A
2 ) will depend on regional abatement costs. However, price
convergence as a result of linking (PL) is expected at the level where the welfare gains of
both regions are equalized. The regional and global welfare gains are measure by equation





i ) · (Ei − E
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i ) | (3.5)
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i ) | (3.6)
Figure 3.2: Illustration of two MAC curves with distinct slopes
19Technological change requires advancement in knowledge and installation hence it is more suitable for the
long-run.
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3.2 Stage-1: Forecasting Baseline Emissions
There are numerous studies on developing methods to forecast various types of GHG
emissions. Earlier studies including Kraft and Kraft (1978), Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995),
Aldy (2006), and Soytas et al. (2007) focused on investigating causal relationships between
carbon emissions and income. Other studies extended their analyses by adding factors
such as energy consumption, energy prices, fossil fuel shares, or even carbon intensity into
consideration [Belke et al. (2011); Hamilton and Turton (2002); Richmond and Kaufmann
(2006); Schmalensee et al. (1998)].
Since the focus of this paper is on state-level carbon emissions analysis, the studies
that are more relevant are Auffhammer and Steinhauser (2012), Burnett et al. (2010), and
Baldwin and Wing (2013). Auffhammer et al. (2004) employs a fixed-effect analysis of
province-level panel data in China to forecast aggregate Chinese CO2 emissions, based on
the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) theory. However, their study does not account the
dynamics between provinces/states that might occur and affects the aggregate emissions.
Burnett et al. (2010) conduct an analysis that includes both spatial and temporal aspects
to properly address the interactions between states in producing emissions. The major
weakness in their analysis is the absence of appropriate autocorrelation parameters between
the states; these are essential in portraying the impacts of change in one state’s condition on
other states’ emissions, known as spatial spillovers, for forecasting purposes. Baldwin and
Wing (2013) employ a combination of complex decomposition and VAR to forecast state-
level emissions. The emissions drivers considered in their study are economic activity, energy
use, states’ output, states’ per capita income and population. Nevertheless, their study does
not take into account the dynamics of the emissions drivers in the future as they may vary
across time.
Consistent with previous studies, this paper incorporates exogenous factors, or emissions
drivers, related to baseline emissions (economic activity, supply and demand dynamics,
energy types and prices, and effects of environmental programs) and forecasts the emissions
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level via a VAR framework. It focuses on one type of GHG, carbon dioxide (CO2), at the
power plant level in relevant states. By estimating the level of impacts of historical values
of the emissions drivers on the baseline emissions and incorporating the forecast values
of these factors, this paper then forecast the level of baseline emissions at the state level.
One significant contribution of this section to the literature is the analysis of emissions on
a monthly basis in contrast to previous studies that mainly focus on annual data. The
following subsection describes the significance of monthly analysis to forecasting emissions.
3.2.1 Identification
Considering that CO2 as the major GHG produced in the U.S.
20, combustion as the
main source of CO2 emissions, the electricity sector as the largest source of GHG emissions,
and most permit markets regulate the electricity sector, the state level of aggregated power
plant emissions can be used to represent overall emissions behavior in the states. Since the
electrical sector requires instantaneous matching of supply and demand, both factors have
to be considered in the estimation.
On the demand side, the model in this chapter uses two exogenous parameters that
influence electricity demand: economic activity and weather. Using these parameter, the
fluctuation in demand can be captured to further analyze the parameters impacts on states’
emissions, as impacts on emissions due to changes in the activity and condition in each state.
Many researchers have identified the critical relationship between environmental condition
and economic activity, and therefore this paper employs state-level GDP per capita as a
common proxy for economic activity to appropriately capture any economic activity impact
on emissions.
Weather is another important factor in emissions. It can be observed from the monthly
emissions data that the magnitude of emissions changes varies widely from one place to
20According to the EPA report, estimated emissions in 1990-2012 of CO2, CH4, N2O, and fluorinated gases
account for 82.5%, 8.7%, 6.3%, and 2.5% respectively.
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another. California, which has a warmer climate, has less magnitude change than states in
the Northeast area, where temperature varies widely from summer to winter. Therefore, it is
essential to capture this variation in temperature that might influence emissions. This paper
uses cooling degree days (CDD) and heating degree days (HDD) as proxies for temperature.
On the supply side, all states consume various types of energy, such as coal, natural
gas, renewables, nuclear, and petroleum. This paper focuses on the first four types in
order to capture the carbon-intensive behavior they display. Petroleum is omitted from the
estimation because it accounts for the smallest share of energy source type for electricity
generation in both regions. Energy prices are often used to capture the response of electricity
producers to type of energy used for generation. Therefore, this study uses coal and natural
gas prices to control for the effect of prices on supply. Since renewable energy and nuclear
do not have prices, it is valid to observe the response using electricity generation from the
two energy source types. US prices are opted to avoid endogeneity problems if regional
prices are used instead. Regional energy prices tend to be influenced by environmental
constraints imposed in the respective region, especially in California and RGGI where coal
and natural gas are the two main sources for electricity generation.
3.2.2 Data
The dataset used in this study consists of approximately 168 monthly observations of
total CO2 emissions of the regions of interest (California and RGGI) in the time period
1998M1 -2011M12. The identification process describes the connection between emissions




The EPA provides monthly aggregated emissions figures for power plants across the
states, including CO2, SO2, and NOx. The EPA requires all units over 25 Megawatts (MW)
with relatively high sulfur content to report their emissions. Since the data also provide
the location of each power plant, power plant-level monthly emissions will be aggregated to
state-level for convenience in measurement. Units of total monthly emissions are short tons.
3.2.2.2 Economic Activity
As has been shown in other studies, real GDP per capita at the state level is a good
proxy for economic activity in each state. Real GDP data on a monthly basis is limited as
most government agencies provide data on a quarterly and annual basis. Hence, the use
of interpolated monthly values of real GDP is appropriate [Bernanke et al. (1997)]. These
values are provided by Wolfram Alpha. The unit of real GDP per capita is USD per capita.
3.2.2.3 CDD and HDD Data
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides monthly
average cooling degree days (CDD) and heating degree days (HDD) data in degrees
Fahrenheit for each state. The monthly state’s average is calculated by population-weighted
based on 2010 census population data. The unit of temperature is degree Fahrenheit.
3.2.2.4 Renewable and Nuclear Supply
To control for energy supply from renewable and nuclear energy, this study uses electricity
generation from both energy source types of each state. The statistics of monthly average
production share are acquired from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA). Units
are in Megawatt hours (MWh).
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3.2.2.5 Energy Price
Coal and natural gas are two of largest energy sources in California and RGGI. To
control for generation of electricity from coal and natural gas, and response of changes in
energy prices, this study uses coal and natural gas prices. The US EIA provides the monthly
average price of coal and natural gas in the US. For coal, this paper uses coal delivered to
electricity generators. For natural gas, it uses natural gas price at Henry Hub. The unit of
both prices is 2012USD per million British thermal unit (Btu).
3.2.3 VAR Model
The vector autoregression (VAR) method is one of the most flexible, effective, and efficient
methods in econometrics for time series analysis as it is able capture the dynamic interactions
between variables [Lütkepohl and Krätzig (2004)]. This study considers a VAR model with
exogenous variables and deterministic terms. The exogenous variables, or emission drivers,
are the factors that influence emissions as previously mentioned. The deterministic terms
included in the model are a linear trend term and monthly dummy variables to account for
seasonality.
Estimating a VAR(p, q) model for (ECA2 , E
RG
2 ) and using data from 1998M1 -2011M12,






















































where t is the index for monthly observation of the data (t=1,. . . ,T), p is the index for
lag-order of endogenous variables determined by the model selection criterion, q is the index
for lag-order of exogenous variables determined by the model selection criterion, Z are GDP
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per capita, CDD, HDD, Energy Supply (by type : renewables and nuclear), Energy Price
(ratio of natural gas and coal), and Sm are seasonal dummy variables, with m = 1,. . . ,12.
All variables are estimated in their levels form. The coefficients α and γ are the
long-term elasticity coefficient for the endogenous and exogenous variables, respectively. A
positive (negative) coefficient implies positive (negative) correlation of right-hand-side and
left-hand-side variable. For example, γ > 0 indicates that an increase in exogenous variable
results in an increase in the carbon emissions. Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics
of the series for California and RGGI.
3.2.4 VAR Estimation Results
The selection of the most appropriate lag-orders of the VAR model is based on the
model selection criteria available in the JMulti program: Akaike Information (AIC), Schwartz
Information (SC), and Hannah Quinn (HQ). Smallest value (or least if negative) suggests a
best model. Table 3.2 shows four best fit models. According to the selection criteria, two
selection criteria (SC and HQ) suggest that the best model is the one with p = 1 and q = 0,
with constant only as the deterministic term. AIC is the only criterion that suggests a model
with p = 2 and q = 1, with constant and trend as the deterministic terms. As mentioned
by Lütkepohl and Krätzig (2004), SC and HQ have the characteristics of providing more
consistent lag-orders compared to AIC, which tend to overestimate the lag-orders. Therefore,
(p, q) = (1, 0) is chosen as the model for VAR analysis.
The overview of results of VAR estimation with (p, q) = (1, 0) is shown in Equation 3.8.
Equation 3.9 presents the variance-covariance matrix of the estimation.21 The p-values
are given in the parentheses underneath each coefficient estimate and show the statistical
significance of the coefficient estimate. For example, the coefficient estimate is statistically
significant from zero at the 10% confidence level if the p-value is less than 0.1, but not
statistically significant from zero if the p-value is more than 0.1.
21Correlation of both endogenous variables equals -0.06011864.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of data for VAR estimation
Region Variable Units Observation Mean Std. Dev Min Max
California
CO2 Emissions thousand tons CO2e 168 2,950.0 988.2 911.6 5,545.3
GDP per capita 2011 USD per capita 168 1,625.0 271.3 1,114.0 2,033.0
CDD Fahrenheit 168 67.8 80.5 5.0 317.0
HDD Fahrenheit 168 295.4 216.7 9.0 674.0
Nuclear Net Generation thousand MWh 168 2,818.9 483.8 1,364.3 3,382.2
Renewable Net Generation thousand MWh 168 3,284.2 1,265.6 0.0 6,522.4
RGGI
CO2 Emissions thousand tons CO2e 168 10,900.0 2,176.7 6,590.7 16,800.0
GDP per capita 2011 USD per capita 168 213.3 33.7 153.5 266.5
CDD Fahrenheit 168 39.6 70.1 0.0 283.0
HDD Fahrenheit 168 528.5 435.2 1.0 1,485.0
Nuclear Net Generation thousand MWh 168 7,308.6 972.7 3,515.6 8,677.4
Renewable Net Generation thousand MWh 168 53.7 294.4 0.0 3,620.3
US
Coal Price 2012 USD per million Btu 168 1.63 0.43 1.20 2.50
Natural Gas Price 2012 USD per million Btu 168 5.08 2.41 1.70 13.40
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0,0 0,1 1,0 1,1 1,2 2,0 2,1
AIC
Constant + Trend -2.053 -2.161 -2.800 -3.047 -2.965 -2.805 -3.021
Constant -1.979 -2.039 -2.766 -3.032 -2.965 -2.781 -3.003
None -1.569 -1.752 -2.616 -2.978 -2.906 -2.685 -2.963
SC
Constant + Trend -1.160 -0.854 -1.829 -1.666 -1.165 -1.755 -1.559
Constant -1.123 -0.770 -1.833 -1.687 -1.203 -1.769 -1.578
None -0.751 -0.520 -1.720 -1.671 -1.181 -1.710 -1.57
HQ
Constant + Trend -1.690 -1.631 -2.486 -2.406 -2.235 -2.379 -2.427
Constant -1.631 -1.524 -2.487 -2.387 -2.249 -2.370 -2.424
None -1.237 -1.252 -2.448 -2.253 -2.206 -2.290 -2.400
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In VAR analysis, it is essential to conduct stability test to ensure that our model is
appropriate for forecasting and consistent over time. The reason is that if the model is
inappropriate and the time is inconsistent, incorrect results will be very likely. This study
conducts a stability test by using the eigenvalue stability condition, and the VAR model
















































































Equation 3.822 shows the parameter values that are statistically significant from zero at, at
most, a 10% significance level; all variables that are statistically significant have the expected
signs. The other variables that are not statistically significant also influence the emissions
at a lesser impact level than the statistically significant ones. Equation 3.9 displays the
















The previous month’s (or lagged) emission positively affects only its region’s future emissions
at 1% significance. The coefficients are normally expected at 1. However, the existence of
seasonal dummies in the model creates downward bias to the lagged emissions’ coefficients.
22** indicates 1% significance. * indicates 10% significance.
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This condition does not eliminate the validity of the coefficients as seasonal dummies are
also accounted for in forecasting process.
Other region’s emissions are not expected to be statistically significant to other region’s
future emissions, which was expected as there was no historical electricity trading between
California and RGGI. Electricity in California is primarily consumed by the Pacific regions,
and electricity from RGGI is for the Northeastern region. Future linked emissions permit
markets in the electricity sector will provide a platform for one region’s electricity consump-
tions to influence other region’s emissions via permits trading.
The economic activities in each region has insignificant impact to their and other region’s
emissions, only at 10% significance. This condition is not surprising because of the economy
status of the California and RGGI regions, which are already considered at high level. At this
stage, the growth of economic is relatively very small compared to the increase in emissions.
In addition to that, the products are also less electricity-intensive. It is normally expected to
have positive sign on GDP’s coefficients, especially with the economy growth in both regions
over the period of analysis. Hoewever, the unprecedented decline of recorded emissions
in RGGI over the analysis period result in the negative coefficients of GDPs for RGGI’s
emissions.
On the demand side, all statistically significant variables possess the expected signs.
Cooling Degree Day (CDD) positively impacts the emissions in each region at 1% significance,
which means an increase of CDD results in an increase in demand and further increase in
emissions. Heating Degree Day (HDD), on the other hand, has the marginal impacts to
emissions.
For ratio of natural gas and coal prices, the expected sign is positive, which means that
an increase in the ratio (increase of natural gas price relative to coal price, or decrease of
coal price relative to natural gas price) results in an increase of emissions. An increase of
natural gas price relative to coal price will decrease the supply of natural gas and increase
the supply of coal, which further increases the emissions because coal contains much more
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carbon than natural gas.
Renewable energy and nuclear generations have the expected negative sign, which means
increasing generation from each or both will decrease the emissions in the region. Renewable
in California has a statistically significant effect on emissions, because the region has been
using renewable energy for many years. It is less significant in RGGI, however, because they
have been only using renewable since 2009. Nuclear generation is statistically significant in
both regions, with its impacts in California twice as high as in RGGI. A unit increase in
nuclear generation in California decreases California’s emissions by 0.287 unit, while the
same one unit increase of RGGI’s nuclear generation decreases RGGI’s emissions by 0.420
unit.
3.2.5 Emissions Forecast
To construct the forecasts of emissions based on the previously determined VAR model,
predictions of the emission drivers for 2016 - 2025 are incorporated into the previously deter-
mined VAR model. The EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook 2014 provides the annual forecasts
of the exogenous variables in the model, excluding temperature.23 Figure D.1 - Figure C.4
depict the projected growth rate values of the relevant exogenous variables in annual basis,
in each region.24 The annual values are then converted to monthly values by each variable’s
monthly seasonal balance before applying them to the forecasting model.
Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 show the results of the forecasted annual baseline emissions
in both California and RGGI in business-as-usual (BAU) conditions with 95% confidence
interval. Forecast monthly emissions of California and RGGI are provided in Appendix D.
California power plant CO2 emissions are estimated to slightly increase with a consistent
23this chapter assumes constant temperature throughout our period of analysis, for which the values were
determined via averaging the monthly temperature in each region in period 1998M1 -2011M12.
24In EIA (2014) report, the regional classification is based on the U.S. census regions and divisions. this
chapter assumes that the growth rates in the relevant states are equal to the growth rates in the each
state’s region growth rates in California equal growth rates in the Pacific region, and growth rates in the
RGGI equal to the Northeast region.
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trend across the period of forecast analysis (2016-2025). Meanwhile, RGGI is estimated to
have slightly decreasing power plant CO2 emissions. These forecast results are then treated














































Historical Forecast 95% conf. interval
Figure 3.3: Forecast results of annual RGGI CO2 emissions
3.3 Stage-2: Calibrating MAC Curves
This section discusses the calibration of marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves for fur-
ther use as a instrument of the structural model in Stage-3. An estimated MAC for a specific
region characterizes the social cost of abating a unit of emission in the region. Different re-
gions are expected to have different MAC curves as costs vary from one region to another.
Different perspectives (top-down vs. bottom-up) should also produce different results.
There are numerous studies in the literature that focus on generating MAC for specific
regions at various levels: global, national, or subnational. Out of many MACs available
in the literature, our study focuses on the notable reports of Sweeney et al. (2008) and
















































Historical Forecast 95% conf. interval
Figure 3.4: Forecast results of annual RGGI CO2 emissions
RGGI, respectively). The estimated MACs will be calibrated based on the current permit
prices and emissions reduction levels for both respective permit markets. The calibrated
MACs will then be used in the structural economic model to calculate the welfare. This
section proceeds with the estimation framework, existing estimated MAC curves, and
estimated MACs calibration.
3.3.1 Estimation Framework
The methodology to determine the MAC function in each region uses a least-squares
technique on the basis of estimated MAC curves available in the literature. The method
estimates the elasticities of substitution by setting the objective of minimizing the sum of
the squared difference between the function and the existing MAC curve. Let us develop
equation 3.4 by adding choice variables, a, σ, θ, c, P̂ , to make equation 3.10, which lays out






ωi(P̄i − P̂i) (3.10)








i denotes the specific abatement technology-i, P̄i and P̂i are the observed and evaluated
marginal cost values of the MAC at point-i, ai represents the potential abatement level of
technology-i, c(ai) is the marginal cost function of abatement associated with technology-i, p̃
and Q̂ are the arbitrary Harberger (endogenous) calibration points, σ denotes the elasticity
of substitution of the abatement quantity and costs of abatement, and θ represents the
value share of the technology capacity.
3.3.2 Existing MAC Curves
There are three parts in this subsection. The first and second parts respectively describe
the California and RGGI marginal abatement cost curves. The last part presents the estimate
curves of both regions.
3.3.2.1 California MAC Curve
Sweeney et al. (2008) present the California MAC curve for 2008-2020 based on their
estimation on the possible quantity reduction of CO2 emissions associated with the cost
structure in the region. The vertical axis shows the cost of reducing per unit of emissions,
and the horizontal axis shows the possible quantity reduced for a certain policy. Each bar
represents a certain action or policy for emissions reduction, with horizontal axis defines
the amount of potential emissions reduction of a specific policy and vertical axis defines the
average cost for a specific emissions reduction policy. The different colors represent different
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levels of sensitivity of each policy to market-based system such as permit markets or carbon
tax. A very responsive policy means that the policy is maximized when market-based
system exists, while a less responsive policy is not a best option under market-based
system. This figure gives the alternatives for policymakers in California to prioritize policy
with high response to existing permits market in order to reduce emissions with minimal cost.
3.3.2.2 RGGI MAC Curve
McKinsey (2007) report on US GHG activity level in which they also mapped the
marginal abatement cost function of four different regions in the US: West, Midwest, South,
and Northeast. This study uses Northeast MAC curve as target curves, which best repre-
sents states of RGGI, for function estimation.
Figure 3.5: California marginal abatement cost curve, Sweeney et al. (2008)
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Figure 3.6: Regional marginal abatement cost curve, McKinsey (2007)
3.3.2.3 Regional MAC Curves
Figure 3.7 displays estimated MAC curves of both regions for analysis. For the California
curve, this chapter captures only the potential abatement for electricity generation in Cali-
fornia due to the scope of the analysis. For the RGGI curve, it is assumed that the entire
curve shows the potential abatement for electricity generation.25
By comparing both marginal abatement cost curves in one figure, there are two main
distinctions that can be observed. First, California’s curve is quantitatively less than RGGI.
Second, California’s curve is steeper than RGGI, which means that abating in California is
more expensive



































Abatement potential megatons CO2
California RGGI
Figure 3.7: Estimated marginal abatement cost curves
3.3.3 MAC Function Estimation
The estimated MAC functions for California and RGGI are presented in Table 3.3. The
values of σ, which are the elasticity of substitution between the abatement quantity and
costs of abatement, are less than one for both regions. This means that the MAC curves
fit the Arrow-Debreu curves and not the isoelastic Marshallian supply curve.26. The values
of θ, which are the value share parameters for abatement quantity (Q), also vary between
regions. Meanwhile, the calibration points, p̃ and Q̂, are fitted to the target MAC curves.
26Refer to Kiuila and Rutherford (2013) for the significance of Arrow-Debre and isoelastic Marshallian curves.
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Figure 3.8 presents the approximated curves of the MAC functions, detailed in Table 3.3 and
shown by the dashed lines. The solid lines are the targeted curves, or estimated MAC curves
reported by Sweeney et al. (2008) for California and McKinsey (2007) for the Northeast
states (RGGI). Observing the lines, the approximated curves are very close to their respective

























Abatement potential million tons CO2
California California, least-square RGGI RGGI, least-square
Figure 3.8: Estimated marginal abatement cost curves functions
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3.3.4 MAC Calibration
Figure 3.9 presents the calibrated curves of the MAC functions. The calibration
parameters are detailed in Table 3.4. The reference points for calibration are Price2015i
and MAC Adjustment. Price2015i reflects the recorded permit price for the last auction
(July 2015) reported by the California Air Resource Board and RGGI. MACAdjustment
parameter defines the difference of regional cap between 2014 and 2015, which equals the
level of abatement in each region. California allowance allocations are only for the in-state
electricity sector.






MAC Adjustment 106.8 153.4
3.4 Stage-3: Estimating Welfare Gains
This section discusses the estimation of welfare gains from linking different emissions
permit markets. this chapter uses a two-region, dynamic trading model to analyze the
impacts of linking the different regional permit markets on welfare gains by considering the
effects of regional shocks to various factors that are exogenous to the emissions. The period
of analysis ranges from 2016 to 2025 because currently available emission targets in each
region only extend to 2025.27
27California is currently in discussions to set its emission targets up to the year 2050. RGGI has not made




























Abatement potential million tons CO2
California, estimated RGGI, estimated California RGGI
Figure 3.9: Marginal abatement cost curves calibration
This section aims to assess quantitatively the impact of linking two currently existing
permit markets at the subnational level (i.e., California and RGGI) to welfare using a struc-
tural model in a partial equilibrium framework. Previous studies have empirically evaluated
the impacts to welfare of linking permit markets ranging from sectoral level to multinational
levels. At sectoral level, Marschinski et al. (2012) using a general equilibrium framework
find possible distortions to welfare in both regulated and non-regulated sectors when linking
is pursued. At multinational level, Anger (2008) highlights the importance of agreement
between multinational groups prior to linking; without agreement, this linking will result in
only marginal economic benefits or no benefits to the linked markets. Carbone et al. (2009)
argue that a multinational collaboration between permit trading parties may be effective
in achieving global environmental targets, subject to the group members’ conditions and
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cooperation level.
These studies show that linking permit markets at any sectoral and multinational level
could have different impact to welfare. It still remains questionable, though, to what extent
that state-level linking, particularly in the US, impacting their regional welfare. This chapter
offers a quantitative analysis on an integrated US emissions permit market considering
existing established California and RGGI markets. The following section describes the
appropriate model setup for linking permit markets in general. The characteristics of
the California and RGGI permit markets are embedded in the empirical values of the
parameters in the model.
3.4.1 Structural Model Setup
This chapter extends the structural model of chapter 2 by adding time variable to empir-
ically estimates the welfare gains from cost-minimization due to linking the regional permit
markets. This cost-minimizing objective and its constraints are detailed in Equation 3.12 -
3.16.
Let us denote EBi , Ei, ai as the baseline emission level, current emission level, and
abatement effort in region i, respectively. θi is the stochastic shock to baseline emissions
region i. The values are determined previously and detailed in equation 3.9. Equation 3.12
shows the relation of these parameters. The stochastic shocks correlation is determined in
Stage-1. The abatement cost function in region i, Ci(ai), is determined in Stage-2.
ai = E
B
i + θi − Ei (3.12)
Equation 3.13 defines the tradable permit in region i, where Ei is the cap level of emissions
in i and Zi is the amount of permits traded between both region.
28 Zi is positive for buyer




understand the long-term impact of linking permit markets,
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region and negative for seller region. Each region is assumed to face transaction costs of
trading, τi(Zi) > 0.
29
Zi = Ei − Ei (3.13)
Equation 3.14 defines the emissions level of region-i when there is shock θi to the BAU
emissions level, EBAUi . Let λi be the slope of MAC curve region-i and P
CO2
i the permit
price level in region-i.
Ei − (E
BAU
i + θi)− λi · P
CO2
i = 0 (3.14)
If we let Pi(Zi) denote the price of permits in region-i, and given the tradable permits
function, abatement cost function (Ci(ai)), and transaction cost function (τi(Zi)), then
a cost-minimization problem for a regulated region can be developed as shown in equa-
tion 3.15. Equation 3.16 is the reduced form of this cost-minimization problem.
minaiΣi{Pi(Zi) + Ci(ai) + τi(Zi)} s.t. ai, Pi, Zi ≥ 0 (3.15)
minaiΣi{Pi(E
B
i + θi − ai − Ei) + Ci(E
B
i + θi − Ei) + τi(Zi)} s.t. ai, Pi, Zi ≥ 0 (3.16)
Since two regional programs are being considered, we can then characterize the solution
to this minimization problem with the first-order conditions described in equation 3.17
and 3.18. The former shows that, in region-i, a CES function of marginal abatement cost
equates permit prices, which is determined in Stage-2. The latter explains price equality





(Zi) > 0, considering the limitations of
permits available at a certain time.
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i(Zi) = Pj (3.18)
Finally, let us recall equation 3.5 and 3.6 for the welfare gains from trading permits
estimation, regionally and in total. The welfare from trading is estimated once price and
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3.4.2 Estimation Results
The results of the economic model of linking emissions permit markets are presented in
the figures and table below. In Figure 3.10, the upper part presents RGGI’s emission levels
and the lower part presents California’s levels. The results show two significant conditions.
First, the cap levels set by the regulators in each region successfully reduce the emissions
from baseline levels in each region. The no-trade scenario forces the regulated entities to
comply with the cap-setting levels.
Second, linking California and RGGI permit markets decreases RGGI’s and increases
California’s emission levels relative to the no-linking/no-trade scenario. Permits flow from
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the RGGI to the California as California becomes a buyer region and RGGI becomes a seller
region. Table 3.5 displays the numerical levels of emissions under both no-trade and trade
scenarios scenarios and their differences. Linking emissions markets provides the flexibility
to comply with the cap. This flexibility exists mainly because of the difference in abate-
ment costs in California and RGGI. For California-regulated entities, it is cheaper to pursue
abatement by purchasing permits from RGGI-regulated entities, while it is more profitable
for RGGI entities to pursue abatement through technology to reduce emissions, save the
unused permits, and sell them to RGGI entities. Table 3.6 presents the price levels under
both scenarios and their differences. The increasing prices difference over time is caused
raising permits demand in California over the time of analysis as shown in Figure 3.10.
After linking markets is initiated, there are opposing effects of linking to each market
permit prices. On the one hand, escalated permit demand in RGGI due to linking will
definitely raise the price of permits in the range of 4%-13% relative to the no-trade scenario
over the period of analysis. On the other hand, the option of additional permit supply due
to linking puts pressure on the prices of California permits, hence the permit price plummets
when linking with the result that California’s permit prices are expected to drop by 15%-39%
relative to no-trade.
There are two factors that cause significant differences of price change. The first factor
is the larger size of RGGI market relative to California market. The second factor is the
cheaper cost of abatement in RGGI market compared to in California. The combination of
both factors creates a lower permits value environment in RGGI and lessens RGGI permits
scarcity. One caveat about the price change impact is the a priori assumptions of no reserves
or banking/borrowing provision in each region. The existence of banking/borrowing or
reserve permits will disrupt this condition, as each region tends to surrender the reserved
or banked permits first before establishing linking. However, this chapter argues that it is
essential to eliminate the banking/borrowing and reserve provisions prior to linking to reach
optimal economic results from trading.
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Baseline (RGGI) Cap/No Trade (RG) Linked (RGGI)
Baseline (CA) Cap/No Trade (CA) Linked (CA)
Figure 3.10: Projected emissions levels (baseline, cap, and linked) between California and RGGI
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No Trade Trade Difference No Trade Trade Difference
2016 27.74 30.42 9.7% 64.62 61.93 -4.2%
2017 27.13 30.26 11.5% 62.45 59.33 -5.0%
2018 26.53 29.94 12.9% 60.34 56.93 -5.7%
2019 25.93 29.47 13.7% 58.29 54.74 -6.1%
2020 25.33 29.49 16.4% 56.28 52.12 -7.4%
2021 24.72 29.41 19.0% 54.37 49.68 -8.6%
2022 24.12 29.66 23.0% 52.52 46.98 -10.6%
2023 23.52 30.07 27.9% 50.74 44.18 -12.9%
2024 22.92 29.99 30.9% 49.01 41.94 -14.4%
2025 22.32 30.48 36.6% 47.34 39.18 -17.2%
Table 3.6: Price levels and differences in no-trade and trade scenarios, in USD
Year
California RGGI
No Trade Trade Difference No Trade Trade Difference
2016 10.77 9.17 -14.9% 8.80 9.17 4.2%
2017 11.08 9.17 -17.2% 8.75 9.17 4.9%
2018 11.38 9.25 -18.7% 8.78 9.25 5.3%
2019 11.46 9.25 -19.3% 8.77 9.25 5.5%
2020 11.92 9.27 -22.2% 8.70 9.27 6.5%
2021 12.49 9.40 -24.7% 8.75 9.40 7.4%
2022 13.32 9.53 -28.5% 8.76 9.53 8.8%
2023 14.33 9.62 -32.9% 8.71 9.62 10.5%
2024 14.87 9.66 -35.0% 8.68 9.66 11.3%
2025 16.03 9.74 -39.3% 8.60 9.74 13.2%
Figure 3.11 presents the annual levels of permits traded between California and
RGGI. The annual mean of permits show that California imports emissions permits
from RGGI over the analysis period of 2016-2025. A transfer of permits for around
2.7-8.2 MMtonCO2e is expected during this time. The plot also presents the effects of
emissions shocks to distribution of permits traded each year with two other outcomes.
First, the permits trading flow could reverse to the opposite direction, from California
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to RGGI, as the latter becomes permits importer. This condition occurs when emissions
shocks in California decreases its emissions level and yields a non-binding cap. Second, no-





















Figure 3.11: Number of net permits imported by California (positive vertical axis) and RGGI
(negative vertical axis)
The findings demonstrate the necessity of policymakers to periodically review their region’s
emissions level and cap-stringency as emissions shocks can alter projected emissions level
hence yields non-binding cap. Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13 display the distribution of emis-
sions level in California and RGGI and their respective cap position, when shocks to emissions
are considered and markets are linked. In both figures, the range of regional emissions level
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Figure 3.13: RGGI’s range of annual CO2 emissions compared to its cap-setting
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The results ultimately support our hypothesis that the emissions markets, California
and RGGI, will acquire the welfare gains from permits trading when linking is pursued
(see Figure 3.14). The price differences reflected in each regional MAC function stimulate
regions to trade permits to/from other regions. In terms of the distribution, the gains from
trade in California are higher than in RGGI and tend to escalate over time. This condition
is mainly driven by two factors: (1) more substantial emissions changes in California relative
to in RGGI, and (2) larger permit price changes in California market relative to in RGGI
due to trading. The combination of both factors in California outweighs RGGI’s significant


























Figure 3.14: Estimated welfare gains from permits trading, in million US$
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Table 3.7: Mean expected gains from permits trading, in million US$
Year
Compliance Cost Gains from Trade Percentage
California RGGI California RGGI California RGGI
2016 20.04 163.88 3.17 0.70 15.8% 0.4%
2017 23.15 161.22 4.21 0.91 18.2% 0.6%
2018 26.18 162.96 5.01 1.07 19.1% 0.7%
2019 27.15 162.09 5.23 1.12 19.3% 0.7%
2020 32.19 158.98 6.91 1.45 21.5% 0.9%
2021 38.49 161.49 8.87 1.80 23.1% 1.1%
2022 48.24 161.63 12.16 2.40 25.2% 1.5%
2023 60.36 159.03 17.44 3.29 28.9% 2.1%
2024 67.05 157.67 20.40 3.77 30.4% 2.4%
2025 82.13 153.80 27.79 4.91 33.8% 3.2%
Figure 3.14 also shows how the shocks to emissions play part in forming the distribution of
gains-from-trade, as it could result in no-gains (zero expected gains-from-trade) to as high
as US$27.79 million in California and US$4.91 million in RGGI. The zero gains-from-trade
is a result of non-binding caps in both markets cause by downward effects from shocks to
emissions. Under non-binding cap condition, there is no necessities for the markets to trade
their permits. In contrary, the gains-from-trade reach the highest when shocks create upward
effects to emissions and hence increases permit scarcity in each market.
Table 3.7 presents the mean values of expected gains from trade from the distribution
in Figure 3.14. The mean of annual expected gains-from-trade escalates over the analysis
period. For California, the gains multiplied by around 9 times over the course of 10 years,
while it only multiplied by around 7 times in RGGI over the same period. The integrated
market has larger magnitude to California market than RGGI in terms of the ratio of mean
gains from trade to mean compliance cost, 3-28% (California) compare to less than 5% (in
RGGI). These differences are also result of the aforementioned factors that cause relative
differences in permit prices.
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3.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
One of our objectives is to assess the changes in welfare in response to changes in the
stringency of cap-setting between pre-linked markets. In this part, two scenarios of cap-
setting relaxation are proposed: (1) California increases annual caps by 2% and (2) California
reduces annual caps by 2%, while RGGI caps remain the same.30 The cap levels of each
scenario are presented in Table 3.8.
Table 3.8: Level of cap-setting for base scenario, scenario-1, and scenario-2
Year
Base Scenario Scenario 1 Scenario 2
California RGGI Total California RGGI Total California RGGI Total
2016 27.74 64.62 92.35 27.18 64.62 91.80 28.29 64.62 92.91
2017 27.13 62.45 89.59 26.59 62.45 89.04 27.68 62.45 90.13
2018 26.53 60.34 86.88 26.00 60.34 86.35 27.06 60.34 87.41
2019 25.93 58.29 84.22 25.41 58.29 83.70 26.45 58.29 84.74
2020 25.33 56.28 81.61 24.82 56.28 81.10 25.83 56.28 82.12
2021 24.72 54.37 79.10 24.23 54.37 78.60 25.22 54.37 79.59
2022 24.12 52.52 76.64 23.64 52.52 76.16 24.60 52.52 77.13
2023 23.52 50.74 74.26 23.05 50.74 73.79 23.99 50.74 74.73
2024 22.92 49.01 71.93 22.46 49.01 71.47 23.38 49.01 72.39
2025 22.32 47.34 69.66 21.87 47.34 69.21 22.76 47.34 70.11
Figure 3.15 - Figure 3.20 present the impacts of cap stringency changes on projected
emissions, permit prices, and regional welfare gains from trade. In Figure 3.15 and Fig-
ure 3.16, there is similar response of regional emissions level to changes in California’s cap
stringency. The emissions level in both regions decreases as the total cap level decreases
under scenario-1 and increases under scenario-2 when the total cap increases, by less than
1% in both regions.
302% is an arbitrary number. However, one has to consider the relative cap level and baseline emission level
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Base Scenario Scenario-1 Scenario-2
Figure 3.16: RGGI’s emissions level (mean) under sensitivity scenarios
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Table 3.9: Mean permit price under no-trade, trade, and sensitivity scenarios, in US$/CO2
Year
No-Trade (California) No-Trade (RGGI) Trade (Linked Market)
Base Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Base Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Base Scenario 1 Scenario 2
2016 10.77 11.02 10.53 8.80 8.79 8.82 9.17 9.20 9.14
2017 11.08 11.36 10.86 8.75 8.74 8.76 9.17 9.21 9.15
2018 11.38 11.69 11.13 8.78 8.77 8.79 9.25 9.29 9.22
2019 11.46 11.78 11.21 8.77 8.76 8.78 9.25 9.30 9.22
2020 11.92 12.26 11.63 8.70 8.69 8.72 9.27 9.32 9.24
2021 12.49 12.84 12.17 8.75 8.74 8.76 9.40 9.44 9.36
2022 13.32 13.72 12.96 8.76 8.76 8.76 9.53 9.58 9.48
2023 14.33 14.75 13.93 8.71 8.71 8.71 9.62 9.67 9.56
2024 14.87 15.29 14.46 8.68 8.68 8.68 9.66 9.71 9.61
2025 16.03 16.48 15.59 8.60 8.60 8.61 9.74 9.79 9.69
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Table 3.9 shows the permit price responses to changes in cap-stringency prior to linking
(no-trade) and after linking (trade), assuming that emitting entities acknowledge the linking
a priori. Before the initiation of linking, emitting entities in both region responded to cap-
stringency changes in California, therefore the permit prices changes accordingly. Opposite to
the emissions level, permits price increases as stringency increases (scenario-1) and decreases
as stringency decreases (scenario-2).
However, the responses of each market permits price differs under sensitivity scenarios
as shown in Figure 3.17. Albeit permit price changes in both region has similar response to
cap-stringency changes, the magnitude of change differs. California will experience around
1.4-1.7% changes, while RGGI will only experience about 0.5-0.6% changes in permit prices
relative to no-trade scenario. This magnitude of difference is caused by the distinct MAC









































RGGI, Base Scenario RGGI, Scenario-1 RGGI, Scenario-2
California, Base Scenario California, Scenario-1 California, Scenario-2






















Base Scenario Scenario-1 Scenario-2
Figure 3.18: Net permits imported by California (positive vertical axis) and RGGI (negative
vertical axis) under sensitivity scenarios
Figure 3.19 presents the impact of cap-stringency change to number of permits traded.
Relative to base scenario, the quantity of permits traded are more under scenario-1 when
the cap is tightened and are less under scenario-2 when the cap is relaxed. This condition
is mainly driven by the scarcity degree of the permit, which is dominantly influenced by
the higher cost of abatement in California compared to in RGGI. As California tightens the
cap, the degree of permit scarcity raises and further increases the permit prices and trading
quantity. The scarcity, however, lessens when California relaxes its cap under scenario-2
because California’s demand for permits drops.
These conditions further impact welfare gains from trade as shown in Figure 3.19 and Fig-
ure 3.19 for California and RGGI, respectively. More stringent cap levels (Scenario-1) result
in positive impacts to welfare gains from trade in both California and RGGI. More relaxed
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cap levels (Scenario-2) reduces the welfare gains from trade in both regions. Here is where
the corner-solution is in play in the economic-environment trade-off condition. Logically,
less environmental benefit or more environmental damage (i.e., more relaxed cap levels) will
result in more economic benefits. However, our results show that this normal reaction is
not true for all conditions, particularly the linked California and RGGI permit markets.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, in certain conditions a corner-solution results in an
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Base Scenario Scenario-1 Scenario-2
Figure 3.20: Estimated California’s welfare gains from permits trading, in million US$
3.5 Conclusion
Many researchers suggest linking currently scattered permit markets as the solution to
global climate change. While this theory is believed to be an ultimate future solution, a
large portion of the literature only focuses on theoretical analysis of the potential of linking
permit markets. Only a very few studies have conducted quantitative analysis on linking,
with most studies concentrating on the European Union (EU). this chapter contributes to
the literature by providing quantitative measures of the economic implications of linking
two regional permit markets in North America (i.e., California and the Regional Greenhouse
Gases Initiative, or RGGI) and considering the interrelated variables between the two linked
regions. this chapter employs a three-stage approach in this study: (1) stochastic effects
(or shocks) analysis to emissions by exogenous factors (i.e., economic activity, weather,
energy prices, etc.) using vector autoregressive (VAR) technique, (2) estimation of regional
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marginal abatement costs (MAC) functions, and (3) welfare gains from trading analysis using
a dynamic two-region structural economic model of linking permit markets.
The first-stage results show significant impacts of energy demand and supply on emission
levels in California and RGGI and provide forecast baseline emissions for California and
RGGI based on the level of shocks. The second stage estimates the functions of regional
MAC in California (based on Sweeney et al. (2008)) and RGGI (McKinsey (2007)) using
estimation technique presented by Kiuila and Rutherford (2013). The results indicate a
possibility of trading between the two regions/markets.
Incorporating the results of the first two stages into the economic models of linking
yields several important findings. First, linking permit markets changes the pattern of
emissions in each market, with 9-37% emissions increase in California and 4-17% reduction in
RGGI. Second, the magnitude of changes to permit prices differs from one region to another.
California and RGGI permit prices are estimated to decrease by 14-39% and increase by
4-13%, respectively. Third, distributions of welfare gains from trading are unequal across
the linked markets, with California expected to gain 4-6 times more than RGGI. The main
reason for this condition is that the benefits of linking fall more on the California side because
of their significantly high abatement cost compared to RGGI’s abatement cost.
Fourth, the degree of permit scarcity defined by the costly emission reduction in California
drives welfare gains from trade in both regions. A less stringent California emission cap by 2%
under scenario-1 will raise permit scarcity and positively impact welfare gains from trade in
both regions compared to a more relaxed base scenario. However, this positive impact is not
found under scenario-2 in which California relaxes its cap by 2%, as welfare gains from trade
in both regions are less compared to base scenario and scenario-1, which are relatively more
stringent than in scenario-2. The results verify the arguments in previous chapter that the
economic-environment trade-off does not always hold under certain conditions, particularly
concerning a linked system with different abatement cost characteristics such as California
and RGGI.
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In general, this chapter is able to show the impact of shocks to emissions on regional
and total welfare gains from trade when permit markets are linked. However, future work is
needed to add features of current permit markets such as banking/borrowing, offset provi-




CARBON POLICY INTERACTIONS IN CALIFORNIA AND POTENTIAL LOSSES
FROM LINKING EMISSIONS MARKETS
Two of many interpretations of the second-best problem assert that (1) the introduction
of an additional constraint in order to correct a specific market could instead be harmful to
social welfare, and (2) the elimination of a constraint imposed due to addition of a policy
instrument in a multiple constrains setting does not guarantee welfare improvement (Lipsey
and Lancaster (1956); Fullerton (2001); Bennear and Stavins (2007)). In environmental
management, many attempts to correct market failures in addressing externalities from car-
bon dioxide (CO2 or simply carbon) emissions have led to the establishment of various policy
instruments, such as carbon tax, cap-and-trade system (CTS), renewable standards, energy
efficiency standards, and so forth. California has been the leading US state in environmental
aspects as many policy instruments were developed there before being adopted by other re-
gions. California is currently adopting carbon reduction policies for CO2 emissions, with its
two most notable instruments being the renewable portfolio standards (RPS) and CTS via
California Assembly Bill 32 (AB32). As each policy instrument possesses specific objectives
and constraints, the coexistence of multiple policy instruments in the Californian economy
could adversely impact social welfare via distortionary policy effect. This adverse impact of
implementing extra policy to the system is known as the second-best problem.
This chapter contributes to the literature by providing an examination of the adoption
of multiple carbon policy instruments in California (i.e., CTS, RPS, and linked permit trad-
ing) and its implications for welfare. Using the general equilibrium framework, this chapter
presents a model of the state of California with various combinations of policy instruments
at different stringency and coverage levels. The results reveal the potential existence of the
second-best problem in two distinct settings. First, the introduction of an additional pol-
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icy instrument (external permit trading) to the preexisting combination of CTS and RPS
exacerbates environmental and economic inefficiencies. Second, the removal of a policy in-
strument (CTS) from a preexisting combination aggravates welfare losses. These outcomes
demonstrate the necessity of coordinating and understanding the interaction between mul-
tiple carbon policy instruments, particularly in California.
Those studies structure a guideline for this chapter to examine the impacts of the lat-
est environmental events in California, considering preexisting CTS and RPS as a set of
policy instruments regulating the electricity sector. The US EPA proposed a Clean Power
Plan (CPP) program for new and existing power plants in June 2014. This plan aims to
reduce states’ emissions from power plants. The CPP is a part of the Carbon Pollution
Standards under the Clean Air Act, which consists of two types of standards: section 111(b)
for new, modified, and reconstructed power plants, and section 111(d) for existing power
plants. The latter standards provide an extra degree of flexibility to develop states’ specific
plans in achieving their emissions reduction targets. Scholars suggest that this flexibility
opens an opportunity to adopt an integrated emissions permit trading system across the
states, including California. If California decides to adopt an integrated system of permit
trading with external markets such as RGGI (or linked permit markets), then inevitable
implications to economic welfare should be expected, especially considering the coexistence
of other precedent carbon polices.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 presents current
and future carbon policy instruments in California that regulate energy intensive industry.
Section 4.2 outlines the theoretical framework of the interactions of the policies. Section
4.3 presents the model specifications. Section 4.4 describes the data used for the California
model. Section 4.5 discusses the results. Section 4.6 concludes.
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4.1 Carbon Policy Instruments in California
This section explains current California’s cap-and-trade policy, renewable portfolio stan-
dards, and possible their cap-and-trade with external market.
4.1.1 California cap-and-trade (CTS)
California Assembly Bill 32 (AB32) adopts specific regulations and market mechanisms
to achieve the goal of 17% greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction below its business-as-
usual scenario. Enacted in 2006 and put into force in 2012, the regulation initially covered
the utility and industrial sectors, which accounted for 35% of California’s emissions. In
2015, the regulation was expanded to the fuel and natural gas sectors, accounting for 85%
of California’s GHG emissions.
California commenced the cap-and-trade system (CTS) under AB32 in 2013 as part of
the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 that governs the reduction of GHG emissions
from many sources in the state. AB32 was the first carbon reduction program in the US
to take a market mechanism approach and long-term perspective. The program’s goal was
initially to have 2020 emissions level of 20% below the 1990 level, which is equivalent to 17%
below the emissions level in 2013.
Cap-and-trade is widely known as an approach to achieve emissions reduction in a cost-
effective fashion. Regulated entities must comply with the cap component, which allocates
an emissions limit that is lower than their business-as-usual (BAU) emissions level. The
trade component provides extra flexibility for the regulated entities to meet the required
limit. Failing to comply with the mandatory limits exposes the entities to hefty penalties.
Currently, California’s CTS regulates the electricity sector, the industrial sector, and fuel
distributors that collectively represent 85% of the state’s total emissions. As a market mech-
anism, the CTS enables allowance (or permit) trading across regulated entities to comply
with their respective emission caps obligation. It is an open market with frequent scheduled
permit auctions held by the California Air Resource Board (CARB).
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4.1.2 Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS)
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) is a nationwide program that regulates the en-
hancement of electricity generation from renewable energy, such as biomass, geothermal,
solar, and wind. Most states in the US have been adopting RPS since the early 2000s with
various state-specific goals. RPS programs provide a certificate for each unit of generation
produced from renewable sectors to be surrendered as compliance.
California started implementing RPS in 2002 with a goal of accelerating the share of
renewable generation to 20% in 2010. The goal was achieved in 2010, and the mandate
was renewed to 33% of generation from renewable sources in 2020. In October 2015, the
mandate was reviewed and renewed again to 50% or renewable generation share in 2030.
4.1.3 Linking Permit Markets via CPP
The EPA recently proposed the Clean Power Plan (CPP) program that develops state-
specific emission reduction targets in the electricity sector based on 2012 state emission
levels. The program allows the states to implement a plan based on the four building blocks
for their compliance options: (1) improve the heat rate of power plants to increase efficiency,
(2) ramp up generation from less carbon-intensive power plants, mainly from natural gas
combined cycle type, (3) increase generation from low- or zero-carbon generation (i.e., re-
newable and nuclear), and (4) improve demand-side energy efficiency. By implementing a
mix of these building blocks with other programs and initiatives (e.g., CTS, RPS, energy
efficiency standards, etc.), the participating states are given full flexibility to achieve their
final reduction targets by 2030.
This flexibility provides the states an option to comply with the program via permit
trading across the participating states. Currently, there is only another established
permit market apart from California, the Regional Greenhouse Gases Initiatives (RGGI).
RGGI is a regional cooperative program initiated by the nine states in the Northeast and
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Mid-Atlantic regions of the US to control emissions reductions from their power plants
via market mechanisms, more commonly known as cap-and-trade or permit market.31 If
the CPP comes into effect, then it is highly likely that linked permit markets between
RGGI and California to coexist with current policy instrument in California (RPS and CTS).
4.2 Conceptual Framework
The main objective of this chapter is to examine the impacts of the interaction of multiple
carbon policy instruments on welfare. It is important to note that the welfare in this chapter
only indicates the economic cost of specific policy.32 The coexistence effect of the carbon
cap-and-trade system (CTS) and renewable portfolio standards (RPS) in California, and the
possible effect of linking CTS with other permit via the EPA’s CPP to welfare are analyzed
using a general equilibrium framework.
This section consists of three discussion segments. The first lays out the mechanism
of the current policy instruments (CTS and RPS). The second lays out the mechanism of
permit markets trading. The third lays out the theory of the general equilibrium model and
its utilization for building the California carbon policy model.
4.2.1 Linked Permit Markets Mechanism
Figure 4.1 illustrates the mechanism that motivates linking two permit markets with dif-
ferent characteristics. Each permit market possesses a specific technology of carbon abate-
ment that affects the attributes of MAC curves, labeled as MAC1 and MAC2. It is assumed
that each market has its specific cap-setting and stringency, labeled as CAP1 and CAP2.
These differences cause different permit price settings in each market, P 1 and P 2, which
prompts permit trading. Under this setting, welfare gain from trade is expected. Refer to
previous chapters for an in-depth explanation of the gains from trade.
31The initiative only targets power plants with generating capacity of 25 megawatts (MW) or greater.
32Other benefit or cost factors (e.g., environment) are excluded.
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of different regional MAC curves and cap-settings that trigger permit
trading
4.2.2 Coexisting Policy Instruments
Figure 4.2 illustrates the impacts of RPS to permits demand when coexist with cap-and-
trade. The permit demand here is the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve, which specifies
the available abatement technology. In non-restrictive conditions, the representative agents
emit carbon emissions at business-as-usual level, labeled as EB0 . Here, permits are not scarce
and the price is therefore set at zero. When standalone CTS is introduced, the permit supply
is fixed at a certain limit, labeled CAP , and permit price shifts to PA1 as permits become
scarce. If permits trading with external market is allowed at a lower external price, the
permit imports are (A-CAP).
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The coexistence of RPS and CTS naturally forces the emitting agents to improve renew-
able sources share for electricity, which reduces carbon emissions without abatement effort
in the fossil fuels sector. A binding RPS lowers the permits demand hence baseline emissions
then shifted downward to EBRPS. However, as the abatement level increases, the effect of this
downward shift fades and eventually meet at vantage point with non-RPS permits demand
curve. Under the same CAP , change of permits demand curve alters permits price to PA2 . If
permits trading with external market is allowed at a lower external price, the permit imports
are (B-CAP) less than (A-CAP). This shows that RPS acts as implicit tariff on permit trade.
Figure 4.2: Illustration of marginal abatement cost curves of CTS with and without RPS
4.2.3 Computable General Equilibrium
A computable general equilibrium (CGE) model offers the ability to estimate the im-
pacts of a policy, a change of policy, or market interactions economy-wide at various levels
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(i.e., regional, state, global). Those impacts are analyzed through changes in consumption,
investment, or welfare of the area of interest. CGE modeling has been extensively used
in empirical policy analysis of trade, climate change, carbon trade, and so forth. In CGE
modeling, the economy is represented by endowment of production factors (i.e., capital and
labor), production technology, consumer preferences, and assumption of optimizing agents.
The coexistence of many policies in California is expected to have implications for the
state-wide economy and its sectors that will be appropriately adjusted to a specific size of a
sector for then to be evaluated by a CGE model.
This chapter employs a static CGE model for California. The description of variables used
in the model is shown in Table 4.1. The model utilizes Mathematical Programming System
for General Equilibrium (MPSGE) developed by Rutherford (1995) following formulation of
Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model by Mathisen (1985). It states that there are three
types of equilibrium conditions that must be satisfied.







Πj(p, y) Profit function earned by sector-j
Cj(p, y) Cost function in sector-j
Rj(p, y) Revenue function in sector-j
Dik Demand function for the commodity-i of agent-k
Variables:
yj Non-negative output quantity of sector-j
pi Non-negative price of the commodity-i
eik Endowment for the commodity-i of agent-k
Ik Total income of agent-k
78
The first type is the zero-profit condition. At any non-negative constant return to scale
production of good yj, this condition defines that the sector-j generates non-positive profits
(Πj) associated with non-negative production of yj as specified in Equation 4.1. Rj(p) and
Cj(p, y) represent the revenue and cost of sector-j, respectively.
−Πj(p, yj) = Cj(p, yj)−Rj(p, yj) = Cj(p, yj)− pjyj ≥ 0 ⊥ yj ≥ 0 (4.1)
The second type is the market clearance condition, which defines that market supply of
a commodity must be greater than or equal to the market demand at any non-negative
price of commodity-i, denoted as pi. Equation 4.2 defines the condition. The first term
indicates the supply of commodity-i. eik denotes the total endowment of agent-k. The last









Dik(p, Ik) ≥ 0 ⊥ pi ≥ 0 (4.2)
The third type is the income balance condition as shown in Equation 4.3. This condition
defines that income of representative agent k, denoted as Ik, must equal the total value
of the production factor endowed by agent k. Further, Walras’ law balances the total










The model in this chapter is a static computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of
the California economy with base years of 2013 and 2020, which respectively are the starting
year (benchmark) and target year of current environmental programs. The AB32 reduction
target in 2020 is based on the baseline carbon production for 2013, with goal of 17% below
the 2013 level in 2020. The RPS renewable share targets 33% of generation from renewable
sources in 2020.
Table 4.2 displays the sectors, production factors, and agents’ descriptions. The model
has seven production sectors that represent relevant energy and non-energy sectors for carbon
policy assessment. California is modeled as a small open economy, a price taker in the
external market. The price taker assumption does not reduce the validity of the results as
gains from trade are still calculated via the price differences. The model is solved using
GAMS software with MPSGE developed by (Rutherford (1995), Rutherford (1999)).
The model has a representative agent endowed with production factors and wealth, op-
timally deciding consumption and investment. Government activities are also assumed to
be based on the representative agent behavior. Labor and capital are supplied by household
and assumed to stay constant over the time horizon of analysis.
A structure of nested CES is used for both the production of goods (see Figure 4.3)
and consumer preference (Figure 4.4) in California, with assumed constant elasticities of
substitution that represent the intensity of California’s economy. In Figure 4.3, the bottom
level of the nest portrays the substitution between natural gas and oil, labeled as σFF (=
0). Moving upwards, substitution between electricity and the composite of natural gas and
oil is represented by σE(KLE) (= 0.2).
At the same level, capital and labor can be perfectly substituted with elasticity σV A (=
1). Then the substitution between energy and capital-labor composite is labeled as σKLE
(=0.2). At the top level, all inputs are assumed to have elasticity of σM (= 0) due to the
fixed proportion expectation of the materials and other inputs, including coal.
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Table 4.2: Name and description of sectors, factors, and agents in the CGE model
Name Description
Sector:
COG Natural gas and crude petroleum extraction
COL Coal mining
ELE Electricity generation
GAS Natural gas distribution
OIL Refined petroleum products
MAN Manufacturing and processing goods
SRV Services products









Figure 4.3: Production of good nested CES structure
Figure 4.4: Consumer welfare nested CES structure
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In Figure 4.4 of consumer preference nesting, σHFF (= 0) represents the substitution between
fuels for household agents, σHEL (= 0.5) represents substitution between electricity and fuels
composite, σHS (= 0.5) represents the composite of energy and other consumptions at the
top level, and σHNE (= 1) is the Cobb-Douglas aggregation for non-energy goods.
4.4 Data Descriptions
The IMPLAN group provides the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) of California used for
model calibration in this chapter.33 It is provided for the year 2013, which will be the base
year in this study for the following reasons. First, California’s emissions reduction target
is based on its 2013 emissions level, as the AB32 targets the 2020 emissions level to be
17% below the 2013 emissions level. Second, the latest detailed data on California carbon
emissions by sector and fuel type are only available for the year 2013.
The California Air Resources Board (CARB) provides carbon emissions data for each
sector and fuel type. this chapter uses the emissions detail from CARB to calculate the
carbon coefficients of the model’s sectors and fuel types. Emissions from gasoline are assigned
to the Household sector. The calculated 2013 carbon coefficients for each sector and fuel are
shown in Table 4.3.34
CARB also publishes the carbon price in California. This price averaged $13.60 per
permit in 2013; the latest auction price in Oct 2015 is around $12. This downward trend is
used as a reference for the benchmark price for the California permit market, or CTS, in the
scenario of the model. The price reference from the external market for scenario purposes
in this study is based on the latest Regional Greenhouse Gases Initiatives (RGGI) auction
price. As of October 2015, the latest RGGI permit auction price is $6.10.35
The US Energy Information Agency (EIA) provides the generation share of each fuel
type in California in 2013. These shares are used as the benchmark share for three different





Table 4.3: California’s 2013 carbon coefficient based on the CARB report
Sector
Emissions (million tons CO2)
OIL COL GAS Sector Total
HH 117.60 - 27.38 144.98
GOV 1.46 - 1.80 3.26
COG 0.06 - 16.91 16.97
COL - - 5.60E-05 5.60E-05
GAS - - 0.58 0.58
OIL 23.60 - 4.97 28.56
ELE 1.40 0.60 61.02 63.01
MAN 4.50 1.08 13.74 19.32
SRV 2.47 - 6.22 8.69
AOG 39.56 - 26.79 66.35
Total 351.73
fossil fuel group consists of coal, petroleum, natural gas, and other gases from fossil fuel.
The renewable group consists of the energy types in the RPS guideline such as wind, solar,
biomass, and geothermal.36 The third group is other or non-renewable, non-fossil fuel, such
as nuclear, hydropower, and other fuels. Table 4.4 presents the share of each group.








Elasticity values of the production and utility functions in Table 4.5 are based on the struc-
ture by Balistreri and Rutherford (2001). The values represent California’s economy char-
362013 electricity generation share from renewable of 17.8% provided by EIA is
dissimilar to the 22.7% claimed by the California Public Utilities Commissions
(http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Renewables/). this chapter uses the EIA data as reference
for consistency because it provides more detail about the shares from other energy types.
84
acteristics and intensity.
Table 4.5: Elasticities of substitution used in the model
Label Description Value
Production of Goods
σKLE Elasticity of substitution between production factor and energy inputs 0.2
σV A Elasticity of substitution between capital and labor 1
σE(KLE) Elasticity of substitution between electricity and fuels 0.2
σFF Elasticity of subsitution between oil and gas 0
σM Elasticity of substitution between non-energy inputs 0
σS Elasticity of substitution between inputs 0
Consumer Welfare
σHFF Elasticity of subsitution between fuels 0
σHEL Elasticity of substitution between electricity and fuels 0.5
σHNE Elasticity of subsitution between non-energy goods 1
σHS Elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy goods 0.5
4.5 Results
This section presents the results of sets of policy instruments’ implications for welfare,
generation share by energy type group, local emission level, and carbon price. The analysis
consists of two segments: base scenarios and sensitivity analysis.
The first segment structures the analysis based on a variety of policy combinations, stan-
dalone policy instrument and combination of many policy instruments. The three carbon
policy instruments used in our analysis regulate the electricity sectors: the cap-and-trade
system (CTS), renewable portfolio standards (RPS), and linked permit market via EPA’s
CPP. The second segment varies the stringency and parameters of the policies and examines
various sets of multiple policy instruments.
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4.5.1 Base Scenarios
Table 4.6 details the benchmark case and seven scenarios used in the analysis, constructed
from CTS with the 2020 emission reduction target of 17% below 2013 emissions levels, current
RPS goal of 33% electricity generation from renewable energy sources, and linked permit
trading with external market (i.e., RGGI) at an assumed external carbon price.37
Table 4.6: California carbon policy sets and descriptions
Scenario Description
Bechmark (2013) Current California’s emission level for bechmark
C&T 17% only
California Cap-and-Trade (C&T) with goal of 2020 emissions
17% below 2013 emissions level
RPS 33% only California only enforces RPS with goal of 33% renewable share
C&T 17%
RPS 33%









California enforces both C&T , RPS, and trading with external
market at $6
Table 4.7 present the impacts of these scenarios on emissions reduction and permit
trading parameters. Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 present the scenarios’ implications for
generation share composition and welfare, respectively. For clarity of the implications, the
discussion is divided into two segments: standalone policies and combination policies.
37The model uses the RGGI carbon price of US$6.02 as of September 2015.
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351.72 - - - $11.3
C&T 17%
only
291.93 59.79 0 17.0 % $ 11.5
RPS 33%
only
336.23 16.60 0 4.4 % $ 0
C&T 17%
RPS 33%
291.93 59.79 0 17.0 % $ 10.0
C&T 17%
Trade $6














































Fossil Fuel Share Renewable Share Non-Fossil Fuel, Non-Renewable Share
Figure 4.5: Respective carbon policy implications for generation share
Comparing the standalone scenarios, the standalone cap-and-trade system (CTS) is the
most effective standalone policy in achieving internal emissions reduction of 17% compared
to standalone RPS, with local carbon price at $11.30. The price sets as the benchmark
permits price of California emissions market. Renewable penetration is improved under this
policy, though it is still less than the RPS target of 33% of renewable share. Standalone RPS
could only reduce emissions up to one-third of California’s current reduction goal, with 4.4%
of emissions reduction. This reduction largely comes from improved renewable penetration
that replaces fossil fuel generation. The RPS is less economically efficient, with -0.121%













































Figure 4.6: Respective carbon policy implications for welfare change
The set of CTS and RPS records for -0.032% welfare losses. The carbon permit price sits
at $10, lower than for standalone CTS. The lower permit price means that RPS acts as an
implicit subsidy to domestic CTS entities because the existence of RPS forces improvement
of renewable penetration, which naturally decreases emissions. Since the emissions level is
decreased with lesser in the fossil fuel group, the demand for permits to comply with CTS
through reduction is also decreased and therefore permits become less scarce. Additional
emissions reduction to comply with the cap is attained by increased non-renewable, non-fossil
fuel group share. Emissions reduction and renewable generation share reach respectively 17%
and 33% to achieve their targets.
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A policy with set of CTS and Trade improves welfare to account for only -0.011% of
losses. Allowing trade with external permits market offers less domestic effort to reduce
emissions in fossil fuel generation. The emissions reduction target of 17% is achieved via
domestic reduction of 47 MtCO2 and imported permits of 12.79 MtCO2 from the external
market. In the side effect, this policy set also hinders development of renewable generation
with the least improved renewable share (less than 5% growth) relative to other policy set.
Lastly, the combination of all three instruments (CTS, RPS, and Trade) is able to achieve
both targets of 17% emissions reduction and 33% renewable generation share. Under this
scenario, permit imports are less at 7.92 MtCO2 because of improved renewable penetration
in California that contributes to 14.7% internal emissions reduction. One highlight in the
result of this scenario is that the combination exacerbates welfare losses as it accounts for
-0.035% welfare losses, the worst compared to any scenario with multiple policy instruments.
The decline in welfare is due to the compounding distortions effect. As shown in the
standalone policy segment, policy instruments CTS and RPS create distortions to welfare.
Under normal circumstances, trading with external permit markets generates welfare gains
from trade and therefore the adoption of trade as an additional policy instrument should
offset the distortions. However, since the external permit market must also comply with the
cap, it creates extra distortion as fuel substitution is happening in the external market rather
than decreasing the intensity of fossil fuel generation in California. This condition makes
meeting the RPS goal more costly and therefore produces the compounding distortions effect.
The first distortionary effect to welfare is from the RPS policy in California, the most
costly policy instrument. The second is from the cost of compliance to meet California’s
emissions reduction target via the CTS policy instrument. Once trading is allowed via linked
permit markets, the third distortionary effect comes in as meeting the RPS goal becomes
even more costly. The reason is because the trade allows meeting the total cap through fuel
substitution in external market rather than decreasing the intensity of fossil fuel generation
in California. Consequently, the combination of the three instruments yields higher welfare
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losses. An even lower permits price in the external market will therefore result in higher
welfare losses.
The compounding distortion is an unintended consequence of multiple carbon policy
instruments in California. In the current situation, California has already established
cap-and-trade via AB32 in 2011 and RPS in 2002. If the EPA’s CPP comes into effect and
allows permit trading with the external market (i.e., RGGI), the compounding distortionary
effect could be adversely impacting welfare. To better understand the extent of this effect,
the next part of this section uses sensitivity analysis to adjust and vary the CTS reduction
target, RPS goal, and external carbon price.
4.5.2 Sensitivity Analysis
This study varies the stringency of policy instruments for sensitivity analysis. CTS is
evaluated at 17% and 20% below the 2013 emissions level in 2020. The RPS target is varied
from 33% to 35%. Permit trading with external markets is adjusted via external carbon price
from $6 to $9. The description of scenarios developed for sensitivity analysis is shown in
Table 8. Results are presented in Table 4.9, Table 4.10, and Table 4.11. Figure 4.7 displays
the welfare change difference shown in Table 4.11. For clarity of policy impacts purposes,
the discussion is divided into three parts (CTS and RPS; CTS and Trade; CTS, RPS, and
Trade).
4.5.2.1 CTS and RPS (and No Trade)
There are three findings under the setting when permit trading with external markets is
absent. First, California entities are able to fulfill both RPS and CTS targets by adjusting
their energy sources’ generation share. However, the composition of generation share shows
that renewable penetration target is a priority to be met. Further adjustment to comply
with CTS targets mainly comes from replacing fossil fuels with other fuel types.
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California cap-and-trade (C&T) with goal of 2020 emissions 17% and 20% below 2013 emissions level,
RPS goal of 33% renewable share in 2020, and




California C&T with goal of 2020 emissions 17% and 20% below 2013 emisisons level,
RPS goal of 35% renewable share in 2020, and




California C&T with goal of 2020 emissions 17% and 20% below 2013 emissions level,
No further RPS policy enforced in California, and




California C&T with goal of 2020 emissions 17% and 20% below 2013 emissions level,
No further RPS policy enforced in California, and




California C&T with goal of 2020 emissions 17% and 20% below 2013 emissions level,
RPS goal of 33% renewable share in 2020, and




California C&T with goal of 2020 emissions 17% and 20% below 2013 emissions level,
RPS goal of 35% renewable share in 2020, and




California C&T with goal of 2020 emissions 17% and 20% below 2013 emissions level,
RPS goal of 50% renewable share in 2020, and




California C&T with goal of 2020 emissions 17% and 20% below 2013 emissions level,
RPS goal of 33% renewable share in 2020, and
Permit trading is with external market is allowed with permit price of $9.
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Difference (C&T 20% - C&T 17%)
Figure 4.7: Welfare change difference of cap-and-trade system (CTS) with different strin-
gencies (20% and 17%) combined with other policy instruments.
Second, when the RPS target is improved from 33% to 35%, California’s carbon price
decreases by $0.50 for both CTS stringency targets, 17% and 20%. This condition supports
the previous argument that RPS acts as a subsidy for California’s internal permit trading.
As the most costly policy instrument, improved renewable penetration replaces generation
from carbon-intensive sources in fossil fuel, which lessens the scarcity of permits and hence
reduces the permit price.
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Table 4.10: Composition of generation share by energy source group based on respective
carbon policy
Scenario
CTS 17% CTS 20%
































38.9% 33.0% 28.1% 38.9% 33.0% 28.1%
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Table 4.11: Implications of changes in carbon policy stringencies for welfare change
Scenario
Welfare Change (%) Difference










































Interestingly, the third finding shows that welfare change reflects differently under the
improved CTS stringency and RPS target. Under the CTS stringency of 17%, the improved
RPS target decreases welfare by -0.013%. The opposite effect is observed under the 20%
CTS target, as welfare is actually increased by 0.011% when the RPS target is improved
to 35%. This condition exhibits a first-best setting of additional stringency in which both
economic and environmental goals are met and improved under an adjusted environmental
constraint.
This also supports the argument provided by that decreasing cap stringency does not
necessarily improve economic welfare. Under the RPS 35%, a less stringent cap setting
exacerbates welfare losses.
4.5.2.2 CTS and Trade (and No RPS)
Under the condition of absent RPS instrument and a linked permit market, the adverse
welfare impact is felt less significantly compared to the previous setting. Emissions reduc-
tion in California decreases as linking the permit markets provides a flexibility platform to
reduce emissions. California’s domestic emitting firms import permits from the external
permit market (i.e., RGGI) to fulfill their cap compliance. A more expensive permit price
induces less permits to be imported, with a decrease of around 7.8 MtCO2 under both cap
stringencies. When trade exists, change in the permit trading price under a similar cap
stringency has no impact on the generation share composition.
The difference of the improved cap stringency from 17% to 20% is mainly reflected in
the difference in welfare change. When the external permit price is at the $6 level, increased
cap stringency changes the welfare losses by -0.005%. The impact is even higher under the
more expensive permit price of $9, as welfare losses increases by -0.007%.
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4.5.2.3 CTS, RPS, and Trade
The results for the combination of the three policy instruments support the aforemen-
tioned argument about compounding distortions. Welfare gain from trade is generally ex-
pected in the circumstances where trading is allowed. However, that expectation does not
exist here. The combination of CTS with coexisting carbon policy instruments linking per-
mit markets (trade) and RPS exacerbates welfare losses. Under CTS 17% and RPS 33%,
adoption of trade at the $6 permit price worsens welfare losses by -0.004% (from -0.052% to
-0.056%) compared to the no trade scenario as shown in Table 4.11. The elimination of gains
from trade is shown when the permit price increases to $9, as the welfare improves by 0.017%
to -0.035%. Under normal conditions, welfare gains from trade increases as differences of
each market price grow larger.39
In the case of CTS 17% and RPS 33%, the California market permit price is set at $10.40
As the external market permits price increases from $6 to $9, one would expect less welfare
gains from trade, which would have a positive impact on welfare. The gain from trade does
not exist here because of the compounding distortionary effect that offsets and eliminates
the gains from trade.
The compounding distortion effect is also applied when cap stringency is increased to
20% (with RPS 33%). Adverse welfare impact is observed when trade is allowed at $6, with
welfare losses decreasing by almost -0.03%, from -0.027% to -0.056%. A more expensive
permit trading price at $9 improves welfare by slightly more than 0.01%, to reach -0.042%.
Another insight offered by the results is the compliance priority. Table 9 shows the
generation share composition for scenarios of combining three policy instruments. Under the
same row in the table (the same RPS and Trade conditions), a more stringent California cap
does not change the composition of any RPS and Trade scenario. The California internal
emissions levels shown in Table 8 are also similar as the cap stringency changes. This
39Refer to chapter 2.
40The benchmark prices are from each scenario without trade.
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condition tells us that, when trade is allowed, cap compliance is achieved via a flexibility
mechanism under the trade, which provides cheaper options for CTS regulation compliance.
Increased cap stringency will only increase the number of permits being imported.41
Improving the RPS target to 35% generates a larger magnitude of welfare losses of
-0.068%. This trend highlights the adverse impact of the RPS policy instrument on
welfare when the renewable penetration target increases. As the RPS target becomes
more aggressive, it grants more subsidies to California’s internal permit markets and
lowers their permit values, which will therefore at one point onwards flip the trading for
California firms to become permit exporters. This condition is shown under RPS 50%,
where permit exports are at 1.2 MtCO2. A similar trend of permit trading level is also ex-
pected under a more stringent cap level, CTS 20%. However, since California requires more
permits for domestic compliance, the permits are still imported under the RPS 50% scenario.
4.6 Conclusion
California has been on the forefront of the environmental industry as many policies are
first introduced there. The state is currently adopting renewable portfolio standards (RPS)
and a cap-and-trade system (CTS) under California AB32 to regulate carbon emissions from
electricity generators. Another possible introduction is the Clean Power Plan (CPP) that
provides a platform for emissions permit trading across the nation as a flexibility mechanism.
However, an interpretation of the second-best problem in economics suggests that applying
or eliminating additional constraints in an economy could be harmful to welfare. this chapter
employs a general equilibrium framework to examine the implications of the coexistence of
multiple carbon policy instruments for welfare in California.
The results yield four fundamental findings. First, the policy instruments CTS and RPS
generate welfare losses, with the latter as the most costly option. Under their current goals,
41This condition is only true when the California internal carbon price is higher than the external market
price ($6 or $9). The contrast will trigger permit exports from California to the external market.
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each policy on its own will generate respective welfare changes of -0.014% and -0.121%.
Second, adoption of additional policy instruments could be harmful to welfare. A combi-
nation of the three policy instruments exacerbates welfare due to the compounding distortion
effect. The coexistence of California CTS and linked permit trading with external CTS forms
a fixed cap for both systems. When the RPS policy instrument is also adopted, the effort
to reach the renewable target becomes more costly as fuel substitution is conducted in the
external market rather than replacing carbon-intensive fuel in California. The results show
that adopting linked permit trading in addition to current carbon policy (CTS and RPS) re-
duces welfare to -0.052% from -0.032%. This condition is evidence of the second-best setting
of economic welfare in California carbon management.
Third, eliminating a policy instrument does not necessarily reverse the adverse effect of
policy adoption on welfare as it could also generate welfare losses. The results for coexisting
RPS with another policy instrument, (i.e., CTS), show welfare enhancement compared to a
policy with only RPS. Again, this condition exhibits evidence of the second-best setting in
the California carbon sector.
Fourth, expansion of environmental constraints in a policy could have either a positive or
negative economic impact. As shown in the sensitivity analysis, welfare improves when CTS
sets a more stringent cap (from 17% to 20%) under the existence of RPS. This condition,
however, does not happen when RPS nonexistent, as cap-stringency improvement worsens
welfare by almost 0.005%
The findings provide a platform for the policymakers in California and other regions to (1)
realize that the second-best setting is evident when multiple policy instruments are adopted,
and (2) reevaluate their objectives for optimal policy selection and stringency setting. In
California, the impacts of adopting the EPA’s CPP have to be carefully examined, as a
priori compounding distortions exist. Additional work is necessary to develop a more robust
model and examine the long-term effects by adding features, such as dynamic or cap-and-




The rapid emergence of many policy instruments to internalize the externalization from
greenhouse gas emissions is beyond expectation. California has been actively adopting dif-
ferent types of carbon policy instruments to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from electricity
generation, such as renewable portfolio standards (RPS) and cap-and-trade (or emissions
market) under Assembly Bill 32. The northeastern US states have also implemented state-
specific RPS and established a regional emissions market (RGGI) to control electricity gen-
eration emissions. There are at least two postulations about the coexistence of several policy
instruments within a region and across many regions. The first is that integrating two re-
gional policy instruments (i.e., linking emissions markets) will produce economic benefits
from trading while also achieving emissions reduction targets. The second is that there are
potential losses from the coexistence of more than one policy instrument that overlap in
regulating a specific problem.
This dissertation examines these postulations in three constituents: chapters 2, 3, and 4.
Chapter 2 presents a framework for linking two different emissions markets under scenarios
of different emissions markets attributes. The additional element in the structural model of
this chapter is the stochastic effect (or shocks) on emissions due to exogenous variables, a
feature that is largely ignored in most studies. The results alert policymakers to consider
four factors prior to linking their emissions markets: their programs relative stringency,
their regions emission level, their regional abatement cost characteristics, and, finally, the
correlations between regions. These four factors will determine the economics of linking via
gains from trade.
The second constituent, in chapter 3, extends the structural model in the previous chapter
by adding a time variable and implementing the model in the real-world case of California and
101
the RGGI emissions market. The chapter estimates the interdependencies of both emissions
markets, forecasts their baseline emissions level, determines the abatement costs functions,
and incorporates the results into the structural model. The findings are significant for
policymakers in three ways. First, shocks on emissions could play a pivotal role in the
effectiveness of the regional cap-and-trade system (CTS). A positive effect of shocks on
emissions increases the emissions level, resulting in more scarcity of permits. A negative
effect of shocks reduces the emissions level, resulting in less scarcity of permits. If the
negative effect is strong enough, then the cap will be non-binding cap, a condition where the
emissions level is higher than the cap, hence the permits are worthless.
Second, imposing a cap-and-trade system (CTS) in California and RGGI reduces their
emissions levels to satisfy their cap-setting. Under a linked emissions markets system, permit
price differences trigger trade between the two regions. California becomes the buyer region
as their emissions rise by 1-24%, and RGGI becomes the seller region when their emissions
drop by 1-13%. Third, the California emissions market is expected to gain more from
linking in terms of welfare economics compared to RGGI because of their significantly more
expensive abatement costs.
Third, under certain conditions, the famous paradigm of economic-environmental trade-
off does not exist. The results of a sensitivity analysis show that if a more expensive region
(California) increases cap-setting to become a more stringent system, then welfare gains
from trade for the linked system improve and vice versa. This is an important finding for
policymakers when considering linking their systems with other regional emissions market.
The third constituent, in chapter 4, uses a general equilibrium framework to examine
the welfare implications of coexisting carbon policy instruments that overlap in regulating
a specific environmental problem. This chapter focuses on California carbon policy, specif-
ically California’s RPS, AB32 cap-and-trade system (CTS), and a possible linked system
of California’s CTS with an external market (trade). The simulation results give us three
noteworthy insights. First, RPS acts as a subsidy policy instrument for internal CTS in Cal-
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ifornia. The binding RPS target reduces generation from fossil-fuel sources, which naturally
decreases emissions from the latter and lessens the permit demand for CTS compliance. This
condition degrades permit scarcity and lowers permit price.
Second, establishing an additional policy instrument could generate either positive or
negative effects on economic welfare. On the one hand, the addition of internal CTS to prior
standalone RPS enhances welfare. On the other hand, when RPS and internal CTS coexist,
establishing a linked emission markets system between California and an external emissions
market (i.e., RGGI) will adversely impact the welfare as a result of the compounded distor-
tions from the coexistence of many policy instruments. These conditions exhibit second-best
interaction in welfare economics.
Third, the selection of targets of the policy instruments is crucial to welfare when many
instruments coexist. The welfare implications of more stringent CTS cap-setting depend on
RPS targets, as welfare improves with more stringent CTS and less aggressive RPS and vice
versa.
The models in this dissertation consider only two emissions markets in the US. With
the introduction of the EPA CPP, a useful extension to this dissertation is to include other
states’ participation in a model of a linked trading system. Doing so could provide a more
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APPENDIX A - VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIVE (VAR) ESTIMATION RESULTS
Table A.1: VAR estimation statistics
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Table Legend
Variable Symbol Coefficient Coefficient
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Lagged Endogenous Terms
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Figure B.7: Historical monthly average coal and natural gas price in the US
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Figure C.4: Projected energy price by source type in California
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Figure D.2: Forecast Monthly Emissions of RGGI
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APPENDIX E - GAMS MODEL
1 $title Carbon Policy Interaction Model
2
3 $if not set st $set st CA
4 $if not set map $set map ca1
5
6 * Read in the accounts
7 set s,f,i,trd;
8
9 parameter y0, yi0, dd0, ddi0, md0, mdi0, fd0, fs0, a0, mn0, d0, m0, x0, xn0,
10 s0, bt0, br0, fe0, fm0, nxe0, fxe0, fx0, brit0, brti0;
11
12 $gdxin %st%_%map%.gdx
13 $load s f i trd
14 $load y0 yi0 dd0 ddi0 md0 mdi0 fd0 fs0 a0 mn0 d0 m0 x0 xn0




19 * Market clearance conditions
20 parameter
21 c0 aggregate consumption,
22 cd0(g) private consumption by good,
23 i0 aggregate investment,
24 id0(g) investement by good,
25 g0 aggregate government services
26 gd0(g) government demand by good;
27
28 c0 = (sum(g,(ddi0(g,"hh")+mdi0(g,"hh"))));
29 cd0(g) = (ddi0(g,"hh")+mdi0(g,"hh"));
30 g0 = (sum(g,(ddi0(g,"gov")+mdi0(g,"gov"))));
31 gd0(g) = (ddi0(g,"gov")+mdi0(g,"gov"));
32 i0 = (sum(g,(ddi0(g,"inv")+mdi0(g,"inv"))));
33 id0(g) = (ddi0(g,"inv")+mdi0(g,"inv"));
34
35 * With the aggregate accounts we generally do not need to
36 * worry about negative imputs (which Tom was treating as outputs)...
37 fd0(f,s)= fd0(f,s) - fs0(f,s);
38
39 parameter cf0 benchmark capital account balance
40 ef0(f) benchmark total factor supply;
41
42 ef0(f) = (sum(i, fe0(i,f))+(sum(trd,fm0(trd,f)-fx0(trd,f))));
43




48 * Emissions data (Fadli’s email 9/14/15)
49 set
120
50 ff(g) fuel sectors /COL,GAS,OIL/
51 e(g) energy goods /COL,GAS,OIL,ELE/
52 ele(g) electricity /ELE/
53 cap(f) capital subset /cap/
54 ;
55
56 table rawemit(*,ff) Raw Emissions data millions of tons of CO2
57 OIL COL GAS
58 HH 117.598 0 27.381
59 GOV 1.463 0 1.797
60 C_G 6.16E-02 0 16.906
61 COL 0 0 5.60E-05
62 GAS 0 0 5.84E-01
63 OIL 23.598 0 4.965
64 ELE 1.397 5.98E-01 61.018
65 MAN 4.504 1.083 13.735
66 SRV 2.470 0.0 6.220




71 emit0 initial California total emissions BtC02
72 emits0(ff,s) initial emissions by sector and fuel BtC02
73 emiti0(ff,i) initial emissions in final demand by fuel BtC02
74 co2limit carbon cap BtC02 ;
75
76 emit0 = 1e-3*sum(ff, sum(s,rawemit(s,ff))+sum(i,rawemit(i,ff)));
77 emits0(ff,s) = 1e-3*rawemit(s,ff);
78 emiti0(ff,i) = 1e-3*rawemit(i,ff);
79 co2limit = emit0;
80
81 * Renewable decomposition
82 Parameter
83 mu0 benchmark share of renewables
84 nrf0 benchmark share of non-renewables and non-FF (ie nuke & hydro)
85 ff0 benchmark share of fossil fuels
86 sk0 sector specific capital payments in renewables
87 nk0 sector specific capital payments in non-RNW non-FF
88 rps Mandated RPS (share of total CA generation)
89 ckr coefficient of renewable capital ;
90
91 * Higher ckr hardens the capital flow to renewable sector
92 ckr = 0.6;
93 mu0 = 0.178;
94 nrf0 = 0.212;
95 ff0 = 1-mu0-nrf0;
96 sk0 = (mu0*(fd0("cap","ele"))+sum(ff,(mu0*((dd0(ff,"ele")+md0(ff,"ele"))))));
97 nk0 = (nrf0*(fd0("cap","ele"))+sum(ff,(nrf0*((dd0(ff,"ele")+md0(ff,"ele"))))));
98 * Calibrate such that we have a marginally binding RPS
99 rps = mu0;
100
101 * Calibration Parameters (http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/data/data.htm)
102 * 2013 Average California’s Carbon Price: $13.567
103 * 2013 AB32 emissions reductions: 3.851 million tons CO2
121
104 * 2013 CO2 Share of covered GHGs: 84%
105






112 Y(s)$sum(g,y0(s,g) and not ELE(s)) ! Sectoral production
113 FFE(s)$(ELE(s)) ! Fossil fuel electricity
114 RNE(s)$(ELE(s)) ! Renewable electicity
115 NRF(s)$(ELE(s)) ! Non-Renewables Non-FF electricity
116 X(g)$s0(g) ! Export
117 A(g)$a0(g) ! Demand for domestic goods
118 C ! Consumption
119 INV ! Investment
120 GOV ! Govt
121 CEMIT ! CO2 emissions
122 SK ! renewables capital
123 NK ! Non-renewables Non-FF capital
124 EXP_CARB$pncarb ! Exports of carbon permits to national market
125 IMP_CARB$pncarb ! Imports of carbon permits from national market
126
127 $commodities:
128 PC ! true cost of living index
129 PINV ! price index on investment
130 PGOV ! price indes on government services
131 PD(g)$d0(g) ! Local goods market
132 PY(g)$s0(g) ! Sectoral output
133 PA(g)$a0(g) ! Domestic goods market
134 PF(f) ! Factor price
135 PSK ! Price index on Renewables capital
136 pske ! Price index on Sector specific capital in renewables
137 PSN ! Price index on Non-Renewables capital
138 psne ! Price index on Sector specific capital in nonrenewables
139 PFX ! Foreign exchange
140 PCARB ! price of CO2 in California
141 PTCARB ! price of CO2 tradable across sectors in California
142
143 $consumers:
144 RA ! Representative domestic agent
145
146 $auxiliary:
147 RSUB$rps ! RPS constraint
148
149 $prod:Y(s)$(sum(g,y0(s,g)) and not ELE(s)) t:0 s:0 m:0 kle:0.2 va(kle):1 e(kle):0.1 ff.tl(e):0
150 o:PY(g) q:y0(s,g)
151 i:PA(g) q:(dd0(g,s)+md0(g,s)) g.tl:$(ff(g))
152 + e:$(e(g) and not ff(g)) m:$(not e(g) and ff("col"))
153 i:PCARB#(ff) q:emits0(ff,s) p:(1e-6) ff.tl:
154 i:PF(f) q:fd0(f,s) va:
155
156 $prod:FFE(s)$(ELE(s)) t:0 s:0 m:0 kle:0.2 va(kle):1 e(kle):0.1 oil(e):0 gas(e):0 col(m):0
157 o:PY(g) q:((1-mu0-nrf0)*(y0(s,g)))
122
158 i:PA(g)$(not ff(g)) q:((1-mu0-nrf0)*((dd0(g,s)+md0(g,s))))
159 + g.tl:$(ff(g)) e:$(e(g) and not ff(g))
160 i:PA(g)$ff(g) q:(dd0(g,s)+md0(g,s))
161 + g.tl:$(ff(g)) e:$(e(g) and not ff(g))
162 i:PCARB#(ff) q:(emits0(ff,s)) p:(1e-6) ff.tl:




167 $prod:RNE(s)$(ELE(s)) t:0 s:0
168 o:PY(g) q:(mu0*(y0(s,g))) a:ra n:RSUB$rps m:-1
169 i:PA(g)$(not ff(g)) q:(mu0*((dd0(g,s)+md0(g,s))))
170 i:PF(f)$(not cap(f)) q:(mu0*(fd0(f,s)))
171 i:PSK q:sk0
172
173 $prod:NRF(s)$(ELE(s)) t:0 s:0
174 o:PY(g) q:(nrf0*(y0(s,g)))
175 i:PA(g)$(not ff(g)) q:(nrf0*((dd0(g,s)+md0(g,s))))
176 i:PF(f)$(not cap(f)) q:(nrf0*(fd0(f,s)))
177 i:PSN q:nk0
178
179 $prod:A(g)$a0(g) s:4 us:8
180 o:PA(g) q:(a0(g)+m0(g))
181 i:PFX q:mn0(g) us:









191 $prod:C s:0.5 ne:1 e:0.5 ff.tl(e):0
192 o:pc q:c0
193 i:PA(g) q:cd0(g) ne:$(not e(g)) e:$(e(g) and not ff(g)) g.tl:$(ff(g))



























220 * TRADE ACTIVITY














235 e:PY(g) q:(sum(i, yi0(i,g)))
236 e:PF(f)$(not cap(f)) q:ef0(f)









246 sum(ele,RNE(ele)*mu0/(RNE(ele)*mu0 + FFE(ele)*(1-mu0-nrf0) + NRF(ele)*nrf0)) - rps =g= 0;
247
248 $offtext
249 $sysinclude mpsgeset implan
250
251 pcarb.l = 0;
252 ptcarb.l = 0;
253 cemit.l = emit0;
254 RSUB.lo = -0.95;
255 RSUB.l=0;





261 implan.iterlim = 0;
262 $include implan.gen
263 solve implan using mcp;
264 abort$(implan.objval > 1e-4) "Calibration fails";
265 * Use the true-cost-of-living index as the numeraire
124
266 pc.fx=1;




271 * Declare the report variables that are assigned in rpt_2.gms
272 parameter welf Welfare index
273 elegen Electricity generation
274 carbon Carbon market parameter
275 ;
276
277 $batinclude rpt_2.gms bmk
278
279 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
280 *CAP & TRADE ONLY (17% below 2013 level by 2020)
281 co2limit = 0.83*co2limit;
282
283 implan.iterlim = 10000;
284 $include implan.gen
285 solve implan using mcp;
286
287 $batinclude rpt_2.gms ct17
288
289 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~




294 implan.iterlim = 10000;
295 $include implan.gen
296 solve implan using mcp;
297
298 $batinclude rpt_2.gms ct17_rps33
299
300 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~




305 implan.iterlim = 10000;
306 $include implan.gen
307 solve implan using mcp;
308
309 $batinclude rpt_2.gms ct17_rps35
310
311 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
312 *CAP & TRADE (83%)
313 * and nation’s permit trade at $6/ton
314 rsub.fx=0;
315 pncarb = 6;
316
317 implan.iterlim = 10000;
318 $include implan.gen
319 solve implan using mcp;
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320
321 $batinclude rpt_2.gms ct17_trd6
322 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
323 *CAP & TRADE (83%)
324 * and nation’s permit trade at $9/ton
325 pncarb = 9;
326
327 implan.iterlim = 10000;
328 $include implan.gen
329 solve implan using mcp;
330
331 $batinclude rpt_2.gms ct17_trd9
332
333 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
334 *CAP & TRADE (83%) and RPS (33% by 2020)
335 * and permit trade at $6/ton
336 rps=0.33;
337 rsub.lo=0;rsub.up=+inf;
338 pncarb = 6;
339
340 implan.iterlim = 10000;
341 $include implan.gen
342 solve implan using mcp;
343
344 $batinclude rpt_2.gms ct17_rps33_trd6
345
346 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
347 *CAP & TRADE (83%) and RPS (35% by 2020)




352 implan.iterlim = 10000;
353 $include implan.gen
354 solve implan using mcp;
355
356 $batinclude rpt_2.gms ct17_rps35_trd6
357
358 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
359 *CAP & TRADE (83%) and RPS (33% by 2020)
360 * and permit trade at $9/ton
361 rps=0.33;
362 rsub.lo=0;rsub.up=+inf;
363 pncarb = 9;
364
365 implan.iterlim = 10000;
366 $include implan.gen
367 solve implan using mcp;
368
369 $batinclude rpt_2.gms ct17_rps33_trd9
370
371 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
372 *CAP & TRADE (83%) and RPS (35% by 2020)





377 implan.iterlim = 10000;
378 $include implan.gen
379 solve implan using mcp;
380
381 $batinclude rpt_2.gms ct17_rps35_trd9
382
383 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
384 *CAP & TRADE (83%) and RPS (50% by 2020)
385 * and permit trade at $6/ton
386 rps=0.50;
387 rsub.lo=0;rsub.up=+inf;
388 pncarb = 6;
389
390 implan.iterlim = 10000;
391 $include implan.gen
392 solve implan using mcp;
393
394 $batinclude rpt_2.gms ct17_rps50_trd6
395
396 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
397 *CAP & TRADE (83%) and RPS (50% by 2020)
398 * and permit trade at $9/ton
399 rps=0.50;
400 rsub.lo=0;rsub.up=+inf;
401 pncarb = 9;
402
403 implan.iterlim = 10000;
404 $include implan.gen
405 solve implan using mcp;
406





412 *CAP & TRADE ONLY (20% below 2013 level by 2020)
413 co2limit = (0.80/0.83)*co2limit;
414 rsub.fx=0;




419 implan.iterlim = 10000;
420 $include implan.gen
421 solve implan using mcp;
422
423 $batinclude rpt_2.gms ct20
424
425 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~





430 implan.iterlim = 10000;
431 $include implan.gen
432 solve implan using mcp;
433
434 $batinclude rpt_2.gms ct20_rps33
435
436 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~




441 implan.iterlim = 10000;
442 $include implan.gen
443 solve implan using mcp;
444
445 $batinclude rpt_2.gms ct20_rps35
446
447 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
448 *CAP & TRADE (80%)
449 * and nation’s permit trade at $6/ton
450 rsub.fx=0;
451 pncarb = 6;
452
453 implan.iterlim = 10000;
454 $include implan.gen
455 solve implan using mcp;
456
457 $batinclude rpt_2.gms ct20_trd6
458 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
459 *CAP & TRADE (80%)
460 * and nation’s permit trade at $9/ton
461 pncarb = 9;
462
463 implan.iterlim = 10000;
464 $include implan.gen
465 solve implan using mcp;
466
467 $batinclude rpt_2.gms ct20_trd9
468
469 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
470 *CAP & TRADE (80%) and RPS (33% by 2020)
471 * and permit trade at $6/ton
472 rps=0.33;
473 rsub.lo=0;rsub.up=+inf;
474 pncarb = 6;
475
476 implan.iterlim = 10000;
477 $include implan.gen
478 solve implan using mcp;
479




483 *CAP & TRADE (80%) and RPS (35% by 2020)




488 implan.iterlim = 10000;
489 $include implan.gen
490 solve implan using mcp;
491
492 $batinclude rpt_2.gms ct20_rps35_trd6
493
494 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
495 *CAP & TRADE (80%) and RPS (33% by 2020)
496 * and permit trade at $9/ton
497 rps=0.33;
498 rsub.lo=0;rsub.up=+inf;
499 pncarb = 9;
500
501 implan.iterlim = 10000;
502 $include implan.gen
503 solve implan using mcp;
504
505 $batinclude rpt_2.gms ct20_rps33_trd9
506
507 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
508 *CAP & TRADE (80%) and RPS (35% by 2020)




513 implan.iterlim = 10000;
514 $include implan.gen
515 solve implan using mcp;
516
517 $batinclude rpt_2.gms ct20_rps35_trd9
518
519 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
520 *CAP & TRADE (80%) and RPS (50% by 2020)
521 * and permit trade at $6/ton
522 rps=0.50;
523 rsub.lo=0;rsub.up=+inf;
524 pncarb = 6;
525
526 implan.iterlim = 10000;
527 $include implan.gen
528 solve implan using mcp;
529
530 $batinclude rpt_2.gms ct20_rps50_trd6
531
532 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
533 *CAP & TRADE (80%) and RPS (50% by 2020)




537 pncarb = 9;
538
539 implan.iterlim = 10000;
540 $include implan.gen
541 solve implan using mcp;
542






549 *NO CAP & TRADE, RPS ONLY 33%
550 co2limit = (1/0.80)*co2limit;
551 rps=0.33;




556 implan.iterlim = 10000;
557 $include implan.gen
558 solve implan using mcp;
559
560 $batinclude rpt_2.gms rps33
561
562 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
563 *NO CAP & TRADE, NO RPS, TRADE ONLY at $6
564 rsub.fx=0;
565 pncarb = 6;
566
567 implan.iterlim = 10000;
568 $include implan.gen
569 solve implan using mcp;
570
571 $batinclude rpt_2.gms trd6
572
573 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
574 *NO CAP & TRADE, NO RPS, TRADE ONLY at $9
575 rsub.fx=0;
576 pncarb = 9;
577
578 implan.iterlim = 10000;
579 $include implan.gen
580 solve implan using mcp;
581




586 *NO CAP & TRADE, NO RPS, TRADE ONLY at $6
587 rps=0.33;
588 rsub.lo=0;rsub.up=+inf;
589 pncarb = 6;
130
590
591 implan.iterlim = 10000;
592 $include implan.gen
593 solve implan using mcp;
594
595 $batinclude rpt_2.gms rps33_trd6
596
597 *~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
598 *NO CAP & TRADE, NO RPS, TRADE ONLY at $9
599 rps=0.33;
600 rsub.lo=0;rsub.up=+inf;
601 pncarb = 9;
602
603 implan.iterlim = 10000;
604 $include implan.gen
605 solve implan using mcp;
606




611 display elegen, carbon, welf;
612
613
614 *=== Export to Excel using GDX utilities
615 *=== First unload to GDX file (occurs during execution phase)
616 *execute_unload "result0.gdx" report0
617 EXECUTE_UNLOAD "results.gdx" elegen carbon welf
618
619 *=== Now write to variable levels to Excel file from GDX
620 EXECUTE ’gdxxrw.exe results.gdx par=elegen rng=electricgen!’
621 EXECUTE ’gdxxrw.exe results.gdx par=carbon rng=carbonmarket!’
622 EXECUTE ’gdxxrw.exe results.gdx par=welf rng=welfare!’
131
